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LABOUR RELATIONS POLICY AND
LAW AS MECHANISMS OF
ADJUSTMENT*
By HARRY J. GLASBEEK**
I. INTRODUCTION
In From Consent to Coercion: The Assault on Trade Union
Freedoms, Panitch and Swartz1 tell us that the savage attacks on
labour over recent times have created a permanent exceptionalism
in Canada: the free collective bargaining rights of Canadian workers
have been eroded to such an extent that they hardly can be said to
exist.2 They argue that more and more groups of workers are
permanently losing their rights to participate in free collective
bargaining as the state imposes income restraints, denies certification
rights to some employees, and uses its powers to declare certain
enterprises in government services essential, thereby denying workers
the right to use collective power. Moreover, they note that even
those workers who have not been directly restricted in these ways
have lost some of their advantages, by the downgrading of the ally
Copyright, 1987, Harry . Glasbeek. Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University, Toronto. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Calgary Sociology
Colloquium, "State, Law and Societal Transformation", November 20-22, 1985.
**Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. An earlier
version of this paper was presented to the Calgary Sociology Colloquium, "State, Law and
Societal Transformation," November 20-22, 1985.
'(Toronto: Garamond Press, 1985).
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doctrine in British Columbia, by labour relations boards reversing
their own earlier pro-union policies (as in the Ontario Eaton strike),
and by initiating attacks (supported by employers) on anti-scab
legislation (as in Quebec).
Their case is an overwhelming one. In this paper I want to
further the examination that they have begun. In particular, I want
to ask the question: how did the successful attack on collective
labour power come about? Panitch and Swartz note that the
build-up for the sweeping attacks on labour has been a steady one.
But they do not answer an unformulated question: why it is that a
state, which did after all bestow benefits bn labour, set out to
undermine its own initiatives? They also have not tackled an
associated problem: how it is that a supposedly strengthened labour
sector has not been able to resist the state's onslaughts? This paper
is a preliminary attempt to answer those questions.
IL SOME ODDS AND ENDS OF THE RHYTHMS AND
CADENCES OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN CANADA:
MUCH ACTIVITY, BUT HOW MUCH CHANGE?
In 1349, the Statute of Labourers was passed in England as
a response to the Black Plague. Because of the intense scarcity of
labour and the pressure this put on the price of labour as the
depleted ranks of workers seemed increasingly unwilling to offer
their services to potential employers, it was made mandatory for
every non-property owner and non-member of a guild to work for
whomsoever should command him to do so. Moreover, the rates
were to be set by reference to the rates which prevailed prior to the
onset of the pestilence. The law further provided that to leave
one's employer without permission was a serious criminal offence, as
was the seduction of an employee away from one place of
employment by another desperate employer.
In 1987, in a Canada which has a regrettable abundance of
labour, every individual is free to refuse to work. Of course, such
an unwillingness to work will disentitle the individual to the
collection of unemployment insurance benefit payments, while a
voluntary quit will disentitle the individual to such benefits for a
relatively lengthy period. Servitude and slavery no longer persist;
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they have been replaced by the freedom to starve. One wonders
what we would do if there were a scarcity of labour in our liberal
democratic nation: would we be more generous than the feudal
state of the fourteenth century?3
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the formation of
trade unions was a criminal offence in itself. Gradually, as trade
unions kept on being formed despite the severe penalties which were
imposed on labour activists, some legislative relief from criminality
per se was granted to trade unions. But courts, both in England and
in Canada, persisted in criminalizing trade union activity and, when
that was no longer possible, they made such activities actionable in
civil court. After World War ii, the advanced industrialized countries
realized that labour organization was inevitable and, perhaps,
necessary.
In 1919 Canada was one of the High Contracting Parties to
the Treaty of Versailles which committed itself to freedom of
association and free collective bargaining. In 1937, the Ontario
government used military and police forces to smash attempts at
unionization at Oshawa; the same was done in 1942 at Kirkland
Lake. By 1944, P.C. 1003 was passed which, in effect, permitted and
encouraged the formation of legally accredited collective bargaining
agents. In 1968, the Woods Task Force, set up by the federal
government to inquire into why there was still so much labour
disturbance in Canada, came out strongly in favour of the retention
and furtherance of collective bargaining as developed in 1944,
although it suggested some technical modifications be made to the
existing schemes.
In 1985, a committee struck by the International Labour
Organization began touring the provinces of Ontario, Newfoundland,
and Alberta to see whether or not some of the provinces' laws
restricted the rights of public sector trade union organization and
activity so much that they breached the internationally accepted
understandings of western liberal democracies in respect of workers'
rights. Normally, the ILO is concerned with countries whose anti-
3The question is rhetorical. Our history gives us the answer. During the war, when there
was a scarcity of labour, people in key positions in some manufacturing industries could not
leave their employ, under pain of penalty. Moreover, wages were controlled by reference to
rates which prevailed at a time when there was an abundance of labour. the Depression.
1987]
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labour laws are notorious, such as Chile or the Phillipines. The ILO
committee found that the Canadian provinces had violated the
minimal standards agreed upon by the international committee.
During the war years, the Marsh Report stated that it was
the obligation of a country such as Canada to provide full
employment and, in as much as it could not do so by enticing the
private sector to invest, the government should initiate public
projects. For those still not employed it would be necessary to set
aside a massive sum for unemployment insurance benefits.4 In 1944,
the federal parliamentary Throne Speech proclaimed that the
primary object of post-war policy would be the creation and
promotion of "social security and human welfare." This included a
national minimum of social welfare, security in employment, the
provision of good diet, housing, health and safety on the job, medical
care, and adequate retirement protection. With the advent of the
first Lester Pearson government, the Economic Council of Canada,
in its First Annual Review, advocated that full employment and
economic growth be the primary objectives of social policy in
Canada. In 1971, the then Liberal government improved
unemployment insurance benefits by loosening the rules of eligibility
and increasing the duration of entitlement.
In 1985, the federal government announced that workers who
were dismissed and who, upon separation from their jobs, were
entitled to lump sum payments by way of severance pay or pension
benefits, would have to offset these sums against any entitlement to
unemployment insurance benefits they might have. There was also
much talk about curtailing the Unemployment Insurance
Corporation's "bounty" that had been bestowed on workers in the
past and a commission (the Forget Commission) was set-up to
inquire into the functioning of the unemployment insurance system.5
Part of its mandate was to determine whether or not the state's
unemployment insurance system ought to be turned over to the
private sector, and whether or not the system was too beneficial to
families which have more than one person on unemployment
4 L.C. Marsh, Report on Social Security for Canada (for the advisory committee on
reconstruction)(Ottawa: E. Cloutier, 1943).
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benefits. The ensuing report suggested sweeping changes which have
been interpreted as, on the whole, being bent upon curtailing
existing entitlements and benefits.
6
One of the great achievements claimed to have been
obtained through collective bargaining since its advent in 1944 is the
curtailment of management's right to dismiss workers arbitrarily. No
longer does the whim and will of an employer determine whether or
not a worker will be employed. Job security has been enhanced, as
have dignity and justice in the work place. Even as these claims
began to be made, unemployment figures in Canada were not
encouraging.
By the 1960s the Economic Council of Canada considered a
rate of 3 percent unemployment to be full employment. By the
mid-1970s economists started claiming that 5 or 6 percent
unemployment was the best that an economy like Canada's could
hope to produce and that this should be considered the equivalent
of full employment. Right now, 7 percent is the figure that is
bandied about in the same way. Canada's unemployment figures
throughout the period that we are considering fare poorly when
compared to those of other advanced industrialized nations.
In this context it is somewhat difficult to understand the
assertions about increased job security and about justice and dignity
on the job in Canada.
In 1971, a Quebec Commission, the Castonguay-Nepveu
Commission, 7 reported that there was a great deal more deprivation
in respect of health and welfare in Quebec than had been
anticipated. The final report called for a guaranteed annual income
system which would provide substantial assistance to the
wage-earning poor. In 1968, the Economic Council of Canada8
revealed that 27 percent of the Canadian population lived in poverty
6The labour representatives on the Commission had made their dissenting views known
before the Commission had reported. In so doing, they detailed what they alleged to be the
main cut-backs to be recommended by the majority report. See, for example, "Atlantic regions
face exodus if jobless benefits are slashed", The [Toronto] Sunday Star (26 October 1986). In
the end, the government felt that it could not act upon the majority's recommendations.
7Report of the Conmission of Enquiry on Health and Social Welfare, Vol. 5, Bk.2, Income
Security, (Quebec, 1971).
8 Fifth Annual Review (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1960), c. 6.
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and that 68 percent of the poor families in Canada were headed by
workers. In 1971, the Croll Commission 9 came to the same
conclusion. Its major conclusion was that Canada needed a federally
financed guaranteed annual income. In 1985, the Macdonald
Commission Report'0 argued for a guaranteed annual welfare system
to clean-up the bureaucratic nightmare of the many social welfare
systems which exist and also to guarantee all Canadian people a
level of acceptable existence, a guarantee which, it was
acknowledged, does not as yet exist.
A recent Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development report shows that Canada lags behind most western
nations in social welfare spending. The study indicates that Canada
devotes 11.8 percent of it gross domestic product to social welfare
spending compared to an average of 14.1 percent for the other
western nations.11
Each day in 1982 and 1983, 1,100 men, women and children
were added to the number of poor people. The number of
Canadians who fell below the poverty line increased from 3.5 to 4.3
million between 1981 and 1983.12 Food banks have an increasing
number of clients. Between October 1984 and March 1985, 7,981
adults and 6,470 children received food in Saskatoon. In Regina, it
was 7,059 adults and 8,524 children, over a similar period. In
Vancouver, in 1983, 71,955 adults and 21,174 children received food
9 Senate of Canada, Poveny in Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971).
lORoyal Conmission on The Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada
(Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1985) (Chair. The Hon. Donald S.
Macdonald).
1!Similarly, the Statistical Report on the Operation of the Unemployment Insurance Act,
CAT. 73-001 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, Unemployment Insurance and Manpower Section),
shows that Canada, in 1981, that is, at the height of the most recent recession, offered less by
way of unemployment insurance coverage than it did before the major 1972 changes.
1 2Poveny in Canada, a discussion paper prepared for the Primate of the Anglican Church
of Canada and the Board of Directors of Stop 103, June 1985.
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from food banks; by 1984, there were 144,250 such adults and 53,834
such children.13
III. THE ARGUMENT: THE IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS AS A FORM OF REGULATION
Until the great depression it was customary to let economic
cycles run their course. This meant that once a boom in the
economy had subsided the deflationary period which followed was
used as a way of lowering the cost of production until a climate for
renewed investment, and the potential for another boom, had been
created. Nineteen-twenty-nine caused so much misery, however,
that Keynesianism in one form or another, was embraced by most of
the advanced industrialized nations, except those which turned to
fascism as a way out of the problem. By Keynesianism economics
I refer to the idea that the state should intervene to manage
demand by increasing consumption during a time of low demand, by
either directly transferring funds to certain economic actors or by
creating employment by undertaking projects and developments.
The state is to do the reverse during a time when demand outstrips
the potential of supply, that is, by transferring funds away from
would-be consumers by taxation or by reducing state support for
activities which lead to increased demand.
After World War II, European countries which adopted the
wisdom of Keynesian economics were faced with the added problem
of restructuring the whole of their economy.14 By and large, western
13 bid. More recently a tacit agreement seems to have developed to the effect that food
banks are permanent institutions as a National Association of Foodbanks is being created; see
G. Riches, Food Banks and the Welfare Crisis (Ottawa: Canadian Council of Social Development,
1986).
14As Adam Przeworski in "Social Democracy as an Historical Phenomenon" (1980) 122 New
Left Review 27, has shown, Keynesianism had special appeal to social democrats who had been
in the vanguard of change in Europe just prior to the war and often immediately after it. This
was so because they felt that nationalization, their initially preferred means, had not succeeded
very well when implemented. Keynesianism suggested that the state was in control and that the
state could be controlled by the electorate (its majority being workers). This was desirable.
Further, Keynesianism made it sensible to promote higher wages as this would lead to higher
consumption which, in turn, would lead to greater profits and more investments and, thus, to
more employment. And, of course, as consumption could be pushed up by state measures,
Keynesian policies also allowed for welfare measures. All of this was dear to social democrats'
1987]
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industrialized European nations accepted the notion that capitalism
had developed to a stage where it should be regarded as a regulated
capitalism rather than a competitive one. This was taken to mean
that individual employers were no longer to seek profits by
maximizing profits at all costs, particularly not by brow-beating
workers into a low wage, low benefit situation. Rather, the idea was
that the state would, in line with Keynesian principles, ensure that
conditions prevailed in which consumer demands would remain at a
high level. To do this, the state would help its enterprises conquer
its domestic markets. It is in this kind of "regulated" economic
climate that it was easy to propose that investors should seek profits
by adding value, rather than by profit-maximization in the classic,
competitive way. What was envisaged was a high productivity/high
wage growth economy. In order to get labour's co-operation for this
kind of economic policy, it was necessary for the state to make
certain arrangements which would benefit labour regardless of the
specific bargaining strength which a group of workers might have
vis-Lt-vis their particular employer. Some of the working and social
conditions of workers were to be set external to the factory situation
so that these benefits could be guaranteed to all.
For instance, as a hike in productivity might mean that
workers would have to accept innovative new managerial techniques
or novel technology, the state undertook to provide greater support
systems for displaced workers such as retraining and early retirement
programs. Understandably, these support systems took different
forms in different settings. Participatory schemes in the work place,
in respect of all or some of these vital issues of concern, giving
workers different, but increasing, degrees of control (often referred
to as industrial democracy) evolved. In some cases the state directly
provided the measures by which to improve floor guarantees for all
workers, in relation to such matters as unemployment, retraining,
pension schemes and maternity leaves. Overall, the kinds of
economic policies pursued were successful. Lipietz records that, for
a while (at least until the late 1960s), increases in wages matched
those in productivity. Eventually, this kind of accord began to break
hearts. Thus, the kind of restructuring which took place in Europe was bound to get the
support of these political arms of working-class movements.
[VOi- 25 NO. 1
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down. Lipietz argues15 that one of the reasons for this was that
workers, feeling that they were shielded from downward pressures in
respect of wages and conditions, got bolder and bolder, causing
employers to perceive that there was a real squeeze on their
profit-making ability. This led to a re-opening of old style battles
and a diminution of the reliance placed on the post-war adaptation
of the Keynesian compromise.
1 6
What is of interest here is that, because the compromises
were based on making labour an institutional partner in the political
economy of each nation state (even if it was often a truly junior
partner in some of these countries), it has not been as easy for the
state in those countries to attack trade unionism as it has been in
North America nor, more importantly from the point of view of this
paper, as easy to undermine the social conditions created for labour,
despite the fact that the dimensions of the economic crisis are
broadly similar. While hardships have been (and are being) imposed
on the working classes of Europe, the commitment to universalized
welfare policies persist. This is offered as an assertion here and as
it is of no further concern to the issues I want to raise in the paper,
I will leave this matter for another time and another place.
17
15"La mondalisation de le crise generale du fordisme, 1967-1984" (1984) 8413 CEPREMAP;
'Towards Global Fordism?" (1982) 132 New Left Rev. 33.
.
1 6 Other reasons, such as the famous political unrest of students in France, also led to a
rupture of the compromise. In addition, many of the protections provided under these
European compromises were not as attractive, nor as useful, as workers had anticipated. This
was particularly so in respect of the amount of control over production which workers had
hoped to gain through the various mechanisms of industrial democracy which had been
provided. To this list of things which went wrong might be added the fact that, by the late
1960s, the EEC developments had created a highly favourable set of conditions for
multi-national capital mobility. While some restraints were imposed on the ability of branch
plants of multinationals to close down operations in one of the member states without
accounting to that nation (See R. Blanpain, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
and Labour Relations, 1976-1979; Experience and Review (Boston: Kluwer, 1979)) it was
increasingly difficult for nation states to control their own domestic markets. The compromises,
originally based on establishing such control, were thus increasingly jeopardized.
17The genesis of this paper is, in fact, my need to work out the thesis that my York
University colleague, Daniel Drache, and I are using as basis for the study of Canadian state
and labour policy in which we try to argue that social conditions in Canada are, by and large,
well below those obtained by the European working classes, precisely because the Keynesian
compromise in Canada was of a very different kind to the one which evolved in Europe after
the second World War. In that study we will try to provide the evidence which will better
found the assertion made in the text above. See also H. Glasbeek and D. Drache, 'The New
Fordism; Capital's Offensive, Labour's Opportunity" (1988) Osgoode Hall LJ. [forthcoming].
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
This skeletal outline of post-war European compromises
identifies industrial relations as an integral part of state policy. This
is not the way that industrial relations is usually perceived in North
America (or in the U.K.). Rather the conventional view of
industrial relations is based on the work of John T. Dunlop. Dunlop
had argued that industrial relations is a system amongst other
systems in society, such as the economic one, whose main
components are identifiable. Such a theory permits a study of the
end results of the interaction of the components of the system, as
well as predictions of what the end result will be when variations in
the nature and scope of the components occur. Dunlop's major
contribution was to list the essential components of an industrial
relations system as being
comprised of three groups of actors - workers and their organizations, managers and
their organizations, and governmental agencies concerned with the work place and
the work community. These groups interact within a specified environment
comprised of three inter-related contexts: the technology, the market or budgetary
constraints and the power relations in the larger community and the derived status
of the actors. An industrial relations system creates an ideology or commonly shared
body of ideas and beliefs regaling the interaction and roles of the actors which helps
to bind the system together.
This approach has been modified, refined and criticised.19
Note that Dunlop's development of the idea that industrial
relations should be seen and studied as a sub-system of politics and
economics coincides with the maturation of collective bargaining
North American-style. While people who call themselves industrial
relations systems analysts argue that the taxonomy is just a heuristic
device and, therefore, does not presuppose a particular kind of
labour relations model, nor a particular set of political values, it is
striking that it is an analytical framework principally used by North
American (and, to a lesser extent, English) scholars working in
jurisdictions in which a specific form of "free" collective bargaining
has become the dominant mode of labour dispute resolution.
At the heart of the North American industrial relations
systems theoreticians' belief is the view that industrial conflict must
1 8 John T. Dunlop, The Industrial Relations System (New York: Holt, 1958).
1 9 See, for example, J. Anderson and M. Gunderson, Union - Management Relations in
Canada (Don Mills, Ont.: Addison-Wesley, 1982) c. 1.
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be regulated. It is their understanding of social order that such
conflict is a manifestation of the dysfunctionality of social
institutions. That is, they do not perceive industrial conflict as
arising from irreconcilable differences, a view which is basic to class
conflict theorists.20  Indeed, the genesis of American and English
industrial relations schools is that formally legitimated collective
bargaining represents the first recognizable attempt at creating a
system which regulates industrial conflict arising out of collective
action necessitated in a society of competing interests with unequal
bargaining power. The pre-existing legitimated scheme, that of
individual contract-making arrangements, was premised on the notion
that industrial conflict was the outcome of aberrant behaviour by
workers who sought to form defensive collectives. That is, the pre-
existing set of legal institutions did not allow for the fact that labour
had to make a response to the pressures and demands imposed on
it by an ever more rapidly changing technological context. The
industrial relations systems analysts are characteristically pluralists, in
the sense that, while they comprehend that capital and labour will
make demands of each other, unlike class conflict analysts, they see
this interchange as one which takes place in a political and economic
environment whose ultimate goals and objectives are acceptable to
these two sets of social actors.21 Thus the shared perception that it
2 0 P, Hyman, Industrial Relations - A Marxist Introduction (London: Macmillan, 1975), has
pointed out how shallow it is to assume that industrial relations should be treated as a study
of the regulation of conflict and how this leads to a superficial preoccupation with the study of
organizations and institutions which produce rules which, in turn, bolster the supposed common
interest in enhancing stability and equilibrium. For that is what happens: students of industrial
relations as a system, no matter how sophisticated they are, tend to concentrate on the
institutions which create the web of rules which regulate the relationships between labour and
capital. For an acknowledgement that this is what conventional industrial relations studies are
all about, see Anderson & Gunderson, ibid.
2 1 See Korpi & Shalev, "Strikes, Power and Polities in the Western Nations, 1900-1976," in
Morris Zeitlin (ed.) Political Power and Social Theory, vol.1, (Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press Inc.,
1980) 301. They argue that the industrial relations pluralist sees conflict as a disruption of
various social institutions. These institutions are responses to the reaction of labour to the
demands imposed on it by a changing economic and technological environment. Some of the
institutions so spawned are means to the development of political democracy, such as universal
suffrage. Another, one more directly dealing with the regulation of the contested spoils of
production between capital and labour, is collective bargaining of some kind. It is from within
this framework that it can be assumed that the social institutions (both of the obviously political
and those of the manifestly economic kind) are the result of movements which, from the
perspective of industrial relations systems theory, need not be questioned. It is the institutions
which are a means to achieve the primary goal, (the control of conflict), which are to be the
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is the appropriate goal of an industrial relations regime to seek to
regulate (contrast outlaw) industrial conflict can be understood. It
is from this perspective also that we can see how Dunlop can write
that, after an acceptable and appropriate rule-making process has
been developed, the competing parties will develop a shared
consensus over time.
The dominant approach which English, U.S., and Canadian
industrial relations analysts have developed is that the ideal kind of
rule-making process assumes that employers and workers are the
actors best situated to determine the content and substance of their
relationship. As is the case in the more primitive individual contract
of employment arrangements, third party intervention should be kept
to a minimum. To put this in Dunlopian terms, employers and
workers should be left to settle their own affairs. In as much as
government, the third actor, is to play a part, it ought to be limited
to the creation and maintenance of the rule-making process, that is,
its principal role ought to be that of facilitator. It is a thesis of this
paper that this holding out of what the dominant institutional
arrangements are all about is obfuscating. In particular, the
conventional industrial relations view, by reducing the role of the
state to that of facilitator and by assuming the development of a
shared consensus, draws attention away from fundamental features
of the political economy. It is a barrier to the development of
another understanding, one which rests on the notion that the state
has a positive interest in supporting the existing relations of
production, capitalist relations of productions, in the specific state
context as best it can 22 and that it does so.23
focus of study, reform, and action.
22This kind of approach to the state's role in regulating capital-labour relations has been
studied by French scholars such as Boyer, who developed a model of "regulation" to help
describe and understand institutional arrangements. By regulation he means
The dynamic pattern of economic change determined not only by the strategies
adopted by individuals in the context of a given wage labour relationship but also by
economic competition, government intervention, and the country's position in the
world economy. The term 'mode of regulation' refers to a particular pattern of
causal factors and mechanisms which together ensure the overall reproduction of the
system with its implicit configuration of economic structures and social forms.
Robert Boyer, "Technological Change, Wage Formation and Employment" in Andrd Boyer,
Delorme, Seborgne and Petit (eds.), vol 1, Aspects de la crise (Paris: Centre D'Etudes
Prospectives D'Economie Mathematique Appliquees a ]a Plenification, 1987); see also "Wage
formiation in historicalperspective: The French experience"; Les transfonnations du rapport salarial
[VOL 25 NO. 1190
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The argument in this paper is that the Canadian state has
successfully characterized the industrial relations system as a semi-
autonomous set of institutions. This presumes to leave issues
between capital and labour to be settled by an evolved private
ordering scheme. It has been possible for the Canadian
state to continue to follow certain policies inimical to the labouring
classes, without having to acknowledge this and, therefore, without
being held politically responsible for doing so. The idea is that
workers have been given an optimal system with which to resolve
disputes with capital in a given political economy. The notion that,
as long as they act within that framework, they play no direct part
in the development and implementation of the nation's industrial
strategies is hidden from view. So too is the fact that the state
exploits the industrial relations framework directly to achieve its
aims. This argument presupposes that the Canadian state has certain
needs and goals and that they can best be, and are, attained by
manipulating a supposedly semi-autonomous set of institutions which
dans la crise - Critiques de l'economie politique - #15-16 Avril, Juin, 1981; Rapport salarial et
analyses en terme de regulation, Economie Appliquee XXXIII, #2, 1980. Note that the words
of the definition of regulation used by Boyer do not, in themselves, differ substantially from
the meaning conveyed by the Dunlop formula on their face. The difference is that of the spirit
which underlies the offerings. The Dunlop framework is based on abstracting industrial
relations from politics and economics. Boyer's 'regulation' is meant to emphasise the
integration of industrial relations' institutions into national strategies. 'Regulation' is both less
significant than the Dunlopian industrial relations system (because it is merely a component
part of a larger scheme) and more important than it because its constituent parts include
externally bestowed benefits and policies, external that is to direct capital-labour agreed-upon
conditions. This paper's argument rests in large part on this difference of emphasis, albeit it
a difference which creates spheres which may, depending on the analysis, overlap to a greater
or lesser extent. For an attempt to apply the concept of 'regulation' to the study of collective
bargaining in Canada, see the unpublished paper of my collaborator Daniel Drache, "Canada
and the Economic Crisis: Industrial Relations As a Mechanism of Adjustment", LEST-CNRS,
Aix-en-Provence, France 1983, (available on request); and his more recent article, "The
Instrumental Role of Labour in a Staple Economy," forthcoming in Ian Parkered., Innis and
the Innis Legacy, (Toronto: Coach House Press, 1986). For explanations of the concept of
'regulation' and its utility, see J. Holmes and C. Leys, "Introduction" in Holmes & Ley, eds.,
Frontyard; Baclard (Between the Lines, 1987) and in the same volume, Liepietz, "The
Globalization of the General Crisis of Fordism", pp. 23-56; see also M. Aglietta, A Theory of
Capitalist Regulation (New York: Schocken, 1979).
2 3The idea that industrial relations mechanisms can be used as an instrument of state policy
is not a startling one. For instance, as seen, when there was a lack of labour in 1349 in
England, the Black Plague statute was enacted to ensure that the employers of the day would
not be coerced by the enhanced bargaining power of workers. This was deemed to be "good"
for the country. For further discussion of both legislation and the role played by the courts
in wage restraints over a long time, see Glasbeek, 'TIP: Another Weapon in the Class War
Waged against Workers" (1981) 3 Canadian Taxation 94.
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are pervasively depicted as the components of a sub-system of the
political and economic systems. These assumptions need to be
supported.
The next section will set out the economic difficulties the
Canadian state has in controlling its own economy. The thrust of
the argument is that a resource based economy has created a
dependency which leaves the state with few weapons with which to
control its destiny and that manipulation of the industrial relations
system, narrowly defined, is a chief weapon in its arsenal. The
second point will be that the prevailing industrial relations system
has left organized labour in a poor position to resist. Institutional
fragmentation of labour, false consciousness about the extent of its
militancy, the centrality of law and the pervasive ideological belief
that liberal pluralism has reached its zenith in the form of Canadian
collective bargaining, all play a part in enfeebling labour. Having
established this, the paper will go on to detail how the logic of
export-led growth policies has gradually caused the Canadian state
to limit and diminish its commitment to "free" collective bargaining
and social welfarism and how it has been relatively free to do so
because labour has never been accepted as a senior political role-
player in the development of Canadian labour-capital-state relations.
The final section tries to establish the structural coherence of the
attacks by the state on what proudly had been claimed to be the
established rights of labour in Canada.
IV. THE POTENTIAL FOR THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
SYSTEM AS A SET OF SEMI-AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTIONS
TO BE USED AS A MEANS OF REGULATION OF THE
ECONOMY BY THE CANADIAN STATE
Keynesianism was adopted as a major policy by Canada
during World War IL By 1944, the war government was announcing
that the ultimate object of a post war Canada would be to provide
"social security and human welfare". This, as we have already noted,
included a commitment to minimum levels of social security, health
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and safety care and to full employment By then, the government
had, in order to obtain labour's cooperation in the war effort, given
Canadian trade unions the same kind of legitimacy in respect of
collective bargaining that U.S. trade unions had been given by the
1935 Wagner Act. 5  The commitment to Keynesian strategies
continued, in the sense that the state gradually - if somewhat slowly
- expanded social welfare policies. In addition to unemployment
insurance schemes (which had come a bit earlier), by 1945 the
federal government had developed proposals on a range of
employment and income matters which committed it "to the
development of a comprehensive nation-wide social security
system".2 6 Prior to World War II there had been in existence a
federally funded pension scheme and workers compensation schemes
in all the provinces. There had also been some welfare programmes
for single and deserted mothers. In the 1950s a somewhat restricted,
but universal, old age security plan was put into place, as well as one
for permanently disabled people and some aid was given to the
unemployed who were not receiving unemployment insurance
benefits. That is, a universal general assistance plan was being
developed. In the 1960s, the spread of a comprehensive health care
system was added to this list of programmes, as well as the evolution
of the CPP-QPP schemes. The general assistance plan, the
2 4 Canada, House of Commons, The Throne Speech, Debates, 1944, Vol. 1-3 (27 January
1944) 2.
25Note that this Canadian labour legislation came much later. In as much as the Wagner
Act was one part of the Keynesian measures of the New Deal, Canada can be seen to have
embraced Keynesianism much later. See DA. Wolfe, "The Rise and Demise of the Keynesian
Era in Canada: Economic Policy, 1930-1982" in M.S. Cross & G.S. Kealey, eds., Modern Canada,
1930-1980's (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1984) 46. The remainder of this section relies
very heavily on the analysis provided by Wolfe in that article. I am indebted. Note that the
late arrival of Keynesian measures in Canada makes sense in the context of the argument
which follows in the text to the effect that Canada's primary economic policy is antagonistic to
classical Keynesian economics.
2 6 See: Splane, "Social Policy-Making in the Government of Canada: Reflections of a
Reformist Bureaucrat" in SA. Yelaja, ed., Canadian Social Policy (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid
Laurier University Press, 1978) 209 at 211.
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Canadian Assistance Plan, was improved and universalized.27 As the
Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto writes:
By the early 1970's, an 'institutional' welfare state existed in Canada. Government
spending on income security and social services was tied to the level of
unemployment, the aging of the population, the educational requirements of the
young, and the medical needs of an industrial society. A vast array 9
non-discretionary universal social programs was an accepted part of Canadian life."
Similarly, on the collective bargaining front, there had been an
entrenchment of, and an enhanced scope given to, trade union
rights. These statutory schemes, the 1946 ruling which gave unions
the Rand check-off-of-dues formula29 (and thereby increased their
security), the huge increase in population (mainly through
immigration),30  most of which settled in urban and other
industrialized centres, combined with the public commitment to the
legitimacy of trade unionism, led to a dramatic increase in trade
union membership. From a low, induced by the depression, of 16.3
percent in 1940, membership rose to 30.3 percent by 1948 and to
33.6 percent by 1971.1 All of this looked like the implementation
of classical Keynesian measures. But Canadian Keynesianism was
not of the same kind as that which a restructuring Europe adopted.
In particular, Keynesianism here has had to take second place to
Canada's major economic plan which, of course, explains why the
anti-cyclical economic policies came so much later in Canada than
elsewhere.
2 7 See: generally David P. Ross, The Working Poor: Wage Earners and the Failure oflncome
Security Policies (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1981) Chapter 3.
28See: Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, "The Rise and Fall of the
Welfare State" in D. Drache and D. Cameron eds, The Other Macdonald Report (Toronto: J.
Lorimer, 1985) 51.
2 9Ford Motor Co. of Canada Lid v. International Union of Automobile, Aircraft and
Agricultural Implement Workers, C.L.L.C. 18,001, Jan. 29, 1946.
30W. Clement, "Canada's Social Structure: Labour and the State, 1930-1980", in Cross &
Kealey, supra, note 25 at 81-82, has shown that, during the 1940s, net migration contributed less
than 10 percent to the population but represented 20 percent of the increase in the 1950s, 22
percent in the 1960s and 34 percent during the mid 1970s. Between 1930 and 1980 Canada's
population went from 10 million to 25 million.
3 1 It now stands at roughly 37 per cent of the work force. Note the relatively slow growth
since 1948. Figures derived from Labour Canada, Labour Organizations in Canada (Ottawa:
Labour Data Branch, 1976-77) at xviii and ibid. (1986), at 18.
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Canada has always relied on the export of its- resources as its
major economic motor. The hope has been that the return on the
sale of resources would lead (i) to capital investment, which
(ii) would spur real growth in manufacturing for further resource
capture and for processing of the extracted resources locally and,
(iii) lead to the development of a manufacturing industry geared to
meeting local domestic consumer demands. In fact, this has never
worked out very satisfactorily. Rather, the pattern has been a
feverish selling of resource commodities when foreign demand was
high and for governments, during such times, to invest heavily in
capital spending and infrastructure such as railways and, more
recently, refineries and the like. Such governmental capital
expenditures are given impetus by the fact that revenues are
increased during such boom sales times, both by the inflow of capital
which pays for the resources and by the tariffs paid by importers into
Canada when consumer demands are high during such buoyant
periods. Both government and the private sector run up high debts
during such times. When a boom subsided the classical economic
policies adopted in Canada dictated that government was to balance
its budget by reducing expenditures to accommodate the reduced
flow of revenues to it. The resulting bust was always severe. When
the Great Depression hit, Canada was very slow to recover because,
as we have noted, it did not employ the anti-cyclical remedies of
Keynesianism as quickly as did other countries3 2
When the federal government, near the end of World War
II, finally accepted the logic of anti-cyclical economic strategies and
proclaimed its commitment to full employment and a socially
protected society, it also announced that it believed that full
employment should be created by an export-led economy 33 That is,
export-led growth was to remain the lynch-pin of Canadian economic
policy. Wolfe has shown that this created inevitable contradictions.
He argues the boom effect will be fuelled by government's spending
32See Wolfe, supra, note 25.
33Wolfe, ibid., note 25, reports that the White Paper on Employment and Income, House of
Commons, 12 April, 1945, outlined that the four main sources of national income which had
to be maintained for the kind of economic growth needed were: "export trade, private investment
in capital stock, private consumption expenditures, and government expenditures." (Emphasis
added).
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of the revenues generated by resource selling and its tariff collection
and this will keep the boom going after it has run its natural
course. This will lead to inflation. Consumer demands will continue
the pressure for imports (in a country where much of consumer
goods and services are imported), leading to trade balance problems.
These, in turn, affect currency value and, eventually, interest rates.
All of this is aggravated by the fact that much of the Canadian
resource and manufacturing sectors is foreign owned or dominated.
In respect of the resource sector this is largely due to the inflow of
U.S. capital which occurred when the U.S. government identified
Canada as a major source for more than half of its key requirements
to help it maintain industrial supremacy.3 4 This was welcomed by an
architect of these Canadian economic policies, C.D. Howe who said
that "Canada .... welcomed the participation of American .... capital.
In Canada, foreign investors are treated the same as domestic
investors"3 5 In addition, it is to be remembered that the export-led
growth strategy assumes that it will lead to investment in Canada
which will create a manufacturing base for resource extraction, for
resource processing and for the development of a self-sufficient
domestic product manufacturing sector. Tariff walls have been
erected to protect investors who want to undertake such
manufacturing. United States branch plants have settled behind
these tariff walls to supply these markets. This foreign investment,
primarily American, has serious effects on the Canadian economy.
This is so because dividends flow out of the country as branch plants
send profits back to their parent organizations and as they pay their
accounts to their parent organizations from whom they are often
forced to buy their materials and machinery for their productive
activities in Canada. That is, they frequently do not obtain their
supplies by adhering to competitive principles. Canada's trade
balance is further adversely affected because these branch plants are
not export-oriented, their access to markets being governed by the
3 4 President's Materials Policy Commision, Resources for Freedom (the Paley Report), 5
vols. (Washington, D.C. 1952). As a result, Canada's manufacturing and resource sectors were
changed structurally. Whereas, in 1946, 35 per cent of Canada's manufacturing was foreign
controlled, this penetration had risen to 56 per cent by 1957; see W. Clement, supra, note 30.
3 5As quoted by DA Wolfe, "Political Culture, Economic Policy and the Growth of Foreign
Investment in Canada 1945-1957", Master's Thesis, Carleton University, 1973, at 120.
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parent's integrated plans for its world-wide strategies. 36 As if all this
were not bad enough, Laxer notes that, very often, branch plants are
only located in Canada because their parent firm requires their
presence here, rather than because Canadian market demands dictate
this kind of investment. This creates inefficiencies, further
exacerbating balance of trade problems. 7
This crude picture of the major thrust of Canadian economic
policy has certain implications for the implementation of classical
Keynesianism in Canada and the ensuing Canadian compromise
which has evolved. The picture being painted follows. The
Canadian economy is guaranteed to be a roller-coaster one because
it depends so much on the price its resources fetch in unreliable
foreign markets. Inevitably, anti-cyclical policies are difficult to apply
as the government reacts to the boom and bust patterns of such
export-led growth.
This problem is aggravated by Canada's federal structure.
Each of the jurisdictions seeks to control its own destiny. National
anti-cyclical policies are difficult to implement, given the fact that
the resource-based provinces, for example, British Columbia or, more
recently, Alberta and Newfoundland, seek to raise revenues from
their resources destined for export, using the same approach that the
national government uses but subjecting it to their local needs which
differ widely from those of other regions at any one time.
The pressures on the balance of payment, and thus on the
currency valuations which, in turn affect interest rates, make it even
more difficult for one of the other main goals of an export-led
3 6 See J. Laxer, Rethinking the Economy (Toronto: New Canada Publications, 1984) 54 ff.
Laxer summarizes the effect of increased U.S. investment and points out its inefficiencies by
quoting from a paper done for the Foreign Investment Review Agency in 1982 which, in turn,
relied on the Gray Report of 1972. The conclusions were that of 90 percent of all Canadian
imports in 1978, 72 percent of the total was accounted for by foreign-owned firms and that
foreign-owned firms had a ratio of imports to sales of 22.4 percent, a level which was five times
as high as that which pertained to Canadian-owned industry.
37This non-competitive kind of investment was given impetus when the United States, in
1971, launched its Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC). This gave tax advantages
to American companies which manufactured for export. By establishing Canadian branch
plants, American enterprises obtained easy access to Canadian markets for such exports and
were thus enabled to take advantage of the tax incentive scheme credit by the American
revenue authorities. Such branch plants were even more intense in their non-competitive
import practices than those established for reasons other than the stimulus provided by the
DISC programme; See Laxer, ibid.
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growth strategy to be achieved, namely, creating the right climate to
attract sufficient investment capital to promote a greater
manufacturing infrastructure. To achieve this end, supplementary
strategies have to be devised. Logically, the state seeks to make the
cost of investment less by passing the burden of an inefficient
economy onto the non-investing part of the economy, that is, the
working classes. This tendency is reinforced because, as our
snapshot of the Canadian economy indicated, it is not possible to
develop a coherent national industrial strategy in an economy which
is fuelled by export-led growth and which continues to have a weak
indigenous manufacturing sector and which is, therefore, heavily
reliant on foreign capital to achieve its aims. As the Canadian
economy is, by necessity, increasingly integrated into its major trading
partner's economy, its policy-makers are left with very few tools with
which to manage the economy. Amongst those few tools available
is the direct grant of assistance to capitalists which, in Canada, is
done by way of allowing accelerated depreciation of capital
resources, subsidies for investment here and in other parts of the
world, and tax expenditures of all kinds.38 The second major tool
which remains available (in the absence of the capacity to use any
fiscal and monetary measures which differ vastly from those of
Canada's major trading partner), is to contain the economic and
social wage of Canadian workers, thereby attracting investment and
maintaining the impetus for export-led growth activity. This kind of
policy runs counter to Keynesian institutions and structures
introduced in the World War II period and since, such as collective
bargaining and social welfare and support systems.
The argument of the paper is now on the table. Given
Canada's major economic policy, industrial relations regulation will
become one of the more important mechanisms of adjustment. It
becomes a central structure in the regulation of our political
economy. As the logic of an export-led growth economy makes it
increasingly difficult to maintain a steady level of investment and
productivity, the costs to investors are to be lowered and productivity
is to be enhanced, in part, by shackling the power of labour and by
disciplining the work force into greater docility. The commitment to
3 8See text infra, note 116.
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treat labour as something of a partner, implicit in post-war
Keynesian policies, gradually has had to be abandoned as the
possibility of building up a viable manufacturing industry while
maintaining both an export-led growth economy and the elements of
an enriched welfare state becomes increasingly more tenuous.
The question which must be tackled next is how the attack
on post-war compromises has met with such success in Canada, given
the fact that there still exists an array of structures which reflect
public recognition of the importance of working class legitimacy,
organization, and needs, that is, while there remains, to this day, a
residual adherence to something of a social welfare state and the
legitimacy of trade unionism.
V. THE INHERENT WEAKNESSES OF CANADIAN TRADE
UNIONISM
Trade unionism gained its recognition as a legitimate actor
in the Canadian political economy when it had the potential for
exercising real power, namely, during World War II when there was
a relative lack of workers and there was a great need for
co-ordinated productivity. This ought to have been the basis for the
creation of a very powerful trade union working class organization.
It did not prove to be so. What follows is a rehearsal of some very
well-known facts about the kind of trade unionism which was
legitimated by the Canadian industrial relations system.
A. Fragmentation
The most notable aspect about our trade union organization
is that its use of economic power is limited, in essence, to the one
employer -- one local setting. The spirit of the industrial relations
system is that the amount of countervailing power created in workers
is to be that of a collection of workers who happen to be employed
by one employer and who, as individuals, would be seriously
disadvantaged in contracting with that employer. Whereas we talk
about trade unions, rather glibly, as national or international
organizations, for the purposes of the statutory collective bargaining
1987]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
scheme the union is the local ageny which has won bargaining rights
vis-a-vis one particular employer in one particular place. While the
local union may be supported administratively and financially by the
whole of the trade union, none of that union's members (who may
work all over Canada and in the United States), may use collective
action to support the local in any dispute in which it is involved.
This fragmentation of economic power is a very serious constraint on
the working classes' potential for making gains. Note here that the
employer which bargains with the one local is not restricted in any
similar way. It may be integrated with a whole number of other
employers, horizontally and vertically, and these employers can assist
each other, not just administratively and financially in respect of a
particular dispute, but also in terms of movement of inventory, the
parcelling out of supplies, the making of agreements to take up the
slack for each other at various dispute times, etc. Some of this
activity may be, because of its close alliance with the employer
targeted by the local, the subject of collective action by the local,
but not by any other affiliated unions which have binding agreements
with the allies, even though they are in the best position to affect
such allied employers. Moreover, it should be noted that the unions'
countervailing power, which supposedly has been created, is often
illusory. This is not only so because most of the legal rights which
allocate bargaining power remain with the employer,3 9 but also
because, in many situations, the power of one employer vastly
outstrips that of the whole of the union of which only one local may
be its adversary. For instance, in 1978, the Royal Bank had
revenues of 3.4 billion dollars, while the total revenue of the largest
union in the land, CUPE, was 15.4 million dollars.4° The same
argument can, of course, be made in respect of General Motors,
vis-ata-vis the CAW, or of INCO and its Steelworkers' Local 6000.
In addition to the fragmentation of the bargaining structure,
one of the fortuitous events which occurred when it was decided
that, as a matter of public policy, workers should have
3 9 See H. Glasbeek, "Law;, Real and Ideological Constraints on the Working Class" in
Gibson & Baldwin eds., Law in a Cynical Society? (Calgary. Carswell, 1985) 282; "Voluntarism,
Liberalism and Grievance Arbitration: Holy Grail, Romance and Real Life" in G. England, cd.,
Essays in Labour Relations Law (Don Mills: CCH Canadian Limited, 1986).
40(1981) 3 The Facts 4.
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American-style legal rights in respect of collective bargaining, was
that these schemes in Canada, unlike in the U.S., should be run
provincially. This was the result of a 1925 Privy Council decision.
But, as Pentland has demonstrated, the granting of labour
jurisdiction to the provinces meant that much of the unionization
was to take place in the face of opposition from small time
employers who had a disproportionate influence in the provincial
economies in which they were located. These employers were
wedded to the old style capitalist competitive modes of production
and were not keen to accept the collective power of trade
unionism. Pentland also attributes the failure to develop a national
labour market to this fragmentation of collective power. As a result,
the relatively great national mobility of the Canadian work force has
come to mean very little in terms of creating an efficient and
productive labour market. Further, he argued, this fragmentation
permitted disparities arising out of regional differences in wealth and
resources to be maintained.4 1 To this catalogue of weaknesses
caused by fragmentation of the labour force, one might also add that
trade unions have had to organize their bureaucracies in a
replicating way throughout the country, each one with its own
institutional interest in remaining different, each one with its own
need to influence its own political system, each one with its own
peculiar problems in respect of bargaining. In this context, a
coherence, in terms of both political and economic activity, has been
increasingly hard to develop.
B. Exaggerated Notions of Militance
These built-in difficulties for the development of united
collective working class power were hidden from view by two major
factors. The first of these is that Canadian unions, on the surface,
41See H.C. Pentland, A Study of the Changing Social, Economic and Political Background
of the Canadian System of Industrial Relations, Draft Study prepared for Task Force on Labour
Relations (The Woods Task Force), Canadian Industrial Relations (Ottawa: Privy Council
Office, 1968). For a furthering of the work of Pentland on the impact of staple-led growth on
the development of the Canadian working class see D. Drache, "The Formation and
Fragmentation of the Canadian Working Class: 1820-1920" (1984) 15 Stud. in Pol. Eco. 43.
1987]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
because they struck a lot, seemed extremely militant once they had
been recognized and promoted by the legitimating industrial relations
statutes. Indeed, it is fair to say that the Canadian trade unions
think of themselves as being very aggressive and forceful (particularly
as they usually compare themselves to their American brothers and
sisters).
But, strikes are not a good indication of militance. They may
be reflections of pent-up demands created at various stages of the
economic cycle, as well as of frustration, rather than of real power.
Indeed, it may be noted that strikes in Canada are meant to be,
and by and large are, very controlled events. They do not occur
until certain time periods have elapsed and certain interventions by
state agencies have occurred. I am referring here to the notice
periods which must be given and the compulsory
conciliation-mediation processes which have been built into Canadian
industrial relations since the turn of the century. Strikes, in fact, are
only permitted during very restricted periods and then they are to be
aimed only at the improvement of the economic conditions of the
workers on strike. Strikes are not permitted in order to gain
recognition, or to settle disputes which arise during the life of an
existing collective agreement. While this is sometimes thought to
be a benefit to workers, the limitation on recognition strikes
diminishes the raising of consciousness which conflictual organization
drives may create, a very important point made by Panitch and
Swartz.42 In addition, the requirement that disputes in respect of
the interpretation and administration of a collective agreement have
to be submitted to a technocratic, legalistic grievance arbitration
process sharply reduces worker participation and democracy, while
expanding the importance of trade union professionalism and the
acceptance by the trade union of its managerial function on behalf
of the employer.43
Having said all this, it remains true that Canada has a much
bemoaned (by the establishment) record of strike activity.
4 2 Supra, note 1.
431 have expounded on this theme elsewhere; see H. Glasbeek, "Voluntarism, liberalism and
grievance arbitration ..." supra, note 39; "The Utility of Model Building - Collins' Capitalist
Discipline and Corporatist Law" (1984) 13 Indust. L.J. 133-152.
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Even if we accept the fact that there is a great deal of strike
activity in Canada, it does not follow that this must be seen as an
illustration of the fact that it is a weapon which trade unions use
because they are powerful. Korpi and Shave144 theorized that, as
workers are always more oppressed at work than they are in the
political arena where they can use their franchise power, it should
follow that, when they are able to make gains through the political
sector they will rely less on collective bargaining with their employers
to make advances. That is, there should be a correlation, one which
shows a diminution in employer-employee bargaining conflicts as
workers gain control over the state's political apparatus. Their study,
designed to test this hypothesis found that, in fact, there was such
a correlation. As will be argued in the remainder of this paper, it
is precisely the Canadian unions' lack of collective political/public
power which make them so dependent on private/economic collective
bargaining. From this perspective, a high incidence of strikes merely
indicates a rather underdeveloped political power rather than a
mature partnership position in state-capital-labour relations.
In any event, the actual incidence and number of strikes in
Canada tends to be exaggerated because it concentrates on the
number of worker hours lost. These are particularly high in Canada
because the system is such that, when workers are actually on strike,
there is, in theory, no reason why the strike should ever end until
the parties so determine. The parties are to be left to their own
economic devices and when one of them decides that the cost of not
working is greater than the cost of working, a settlement will be
reached. That is, a "pure" state of nature is the basis for Canadian
collective bargaining. This leads to an increase of time lost as a
result of strikes.4'
44Supra, note 21.
4 5 While the point is a digression here, it is interesting to note (in this paper which asserts
that the industrial relations system is part and parcel of state policy), that the Canadian state
seeks to make a strike a real cost to workers by removing their state support systems, such as
UIC or welfare benefits, while they are on strike; See R.A. Hasson, "The Cruel War Social
Security Abuse in Canada" (1981) 3 Can. Tax'n: J. Tax Pol'y 114.
There is no such great return to a state of nature attitude in respect of employers
who are involved in a labour relations dispute. Their subsidies, their depreciation allowances,
their tax expenditures, their access to government contracts, etc. are not imperilled during a
strike or lock-out.
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C. The Private Property/Contract Ideology of Collective Bargaining
The real lack of worker power - despite the appearance of
great militancy - is also hidden by the propagated philosophy of the
Canadian industrial relations system. In essence, this propaganda has
been borrowed from the U.S.A. The assumption is that, once
countervailing power has been created on behalf of workers, the
whole range of economic and political goals are achievable and are,
in fact, achieved. Workers will no longer be oppressed by
all-powerful employers and, because of their newly granted collective
bargaining power, will have increased job security. Therefore, the
argument goes, they will come to view their relationships with
employers as being of an indefinite duration, one which gives them
a stake in productive stability over time. The participation of each
worker in all decision-making about working conditions having been
enhanced (by controlling democracy in the union, by the fetters
imposed on the employer, by increased security), the worker has
been made a more sovereign individual.
This line of argument leads to claims that collective
bargaining establishes a semi-autonomous form of government for
employers and employees. Yet, the scheme is ultimately based on
notions which are inherent to a private, individualistic competitive
capitalism. The employer and the workers' bargaining agents are
deemed to be isolated on an economic island, acting in their own
interest. This atomistic, quintessentially competitive private model
is primarily one in which economic claims are to be made. This is
so because, by definition,46 the employer cannot make political
commitments to its workers. 47  The scheme is based on the
individual contract model, with jumped-up power having been given
46Unless the employer is the government, a facet to be tackled below.
47See Glasbeek, "Law, Real and Ideological Constraints on the Working Class", supra, note
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to the workers.4 The pervasiveness of private contract notions is
48The Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations (The Woods Task Force), Canadian
Industrial Relations (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1968), which represented the conventional
views of Canadian industrial relations, was very clear on this:
30. The principle of freedom under the law, in an environment designed
to facilitate individual development and participation, has produced in North America
a pluralistic society reflecting a multitude of cultural backgrounds, values, interests
and goals. The underlying concepts of the free individual, private property and freedom
of contract have produced an essentially capitalistic although mixed enterprise economy.
Subject to certain qualifications, the key element within this system is the corporation,
a legal entity which provides a means both for capital accumulation and for limiting
the risks of enterprise to that capital.
31. The motivating force within this general framework is economic self-interest. Within
the limits of various laws designed to protect the public interest, decisions are permitted to be
made on the basis of individual or institutional gains. These decisions set in motion economic
forces that effect the distribution of available resources among competing ends through the
interaction of capital, labour, and other markets.
32. It is not hard to discover why western societies have, with varying degrees of
doubts, reservations and constraints, accepted the institutions and incentives of the modified
capitalistic or mixed enterprise framework. Despite its faults and shortcomings, the system has so
far provided a greater opportunity for individual and social fulfillment and achievement than any
viable alternative. No effective substitute for the relatively free market has yet been found to
ensure optimum allocation of resources. Nonetheless, it has its deficiencies and detractors.
33. State involvement in the mixed enterprises system has increased. Although it
is still basically a decentralized market-oriented system, the role of the state can be seen in an
increasing number of areas. In some cases government has intervened because of imperfections
in the operation of the system. In other cases intervention has been brought on by inequities
growing out of its unrestrained operation.
34. Cyclical fluctuations have forced the State to intervene in an effort to smooth
out the growth rate for the economy. The early classical economic notions about the
self-correcting nature of the system have been proved unsound. As a result government has
had to employ fiscal, monetary and related policies when the economy proved unable to
produce socially acceptable results.
35. Of more immediate interest have been the efforts by society to curb the worst
abuses of the system. Although state intervention in industrial relations began, in effect, before
the industrialization process, such intervention abated for a time after its introduction and later
reappeared in a variety of forms. Government had to take cognizance of the hardships created
by unemployment, underemployment, sweated labour, low wages, long hours, brutal supervision
and unsafe and unhealthy working conditions. The result was a gradual introduction of
protective labour standards legislation to prevent the harsh social consequences that arose from
unimpeded economic determinism. Thus the force of lawwas put behind what were considered
to be minimum standards to pay and working conditions. Politically determined criteria of
equity were substituted for the terms of employment that would have been produced by
unrestrained market forces. Government thereupon became party to the employment
relationship.
36. At the same time, workers began to join unions and to engage in collective
bargaining with their employers. Although employers resisted this development with all
resources at their command, it eventually became apparent that unions and collective bargaining
were natural concomitants of a mixed enterprise economy. The State then assumed the task
of establishing a framework of rights and responsibilities within which management and
organized labour were to conduct their relations.
37. Government has consequently come to play an integral part in the prevailing
economic system. It is government's expanding role that has made it a "modified" capitalistic
or "mixed" enterprise system. Yet despite this growing state involvement the economy remains
largely governed by competitive and institutional forces created by individuals and organizations
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
such that even when industrial, region-wide bargaining (or even
public sector bargaining) takes place, it is seen as nothing but a
variant of the contract model.49
That the ideology of private contract making/private ordering
is central to the Canadian industrial relations scheme can be seen
from the fact that it has left untouched notions of private property
which were the corner-stone of nineteenth century individual
contract of employment doctrines. This has a major impact on the
actual practices of industrial relations and on the kind of ideological
scheme which may be used to justify putting fetters on labour.
It assumes that private property ownership and its legal
attributes and qualities are, in the end, unquestionable. In the
collective bargaining setting, this means that those with property
rights - that is, employers - can exercise them as they see fit,
subject only to agreed-to limitations. That is, what workers do not
win through their struggles for control over their working life
remains within the domain of those who have bought their labour
power and own the assets of the enterprise in the operation of
which they will translate that labour power into labour. The ensuing
prerogative of management comes to be seen as (i) an inherent right
which cannot be disturbed by workers who have not contractually
managed to do so, (ii) as a right which cannot be derogated from by
the adjudicators who administer collective agreements and, (iii) which
cannot be interfered with by a state which, in other jurisdictions with
different understandings of the labour-capital accord, would inhibit
employers to a much greater extent from using their private property
power to browbeat workers by threats of, or by actual, deinvestment.
D. The Centrality and Significance of Law
A major consequence of making private contract/private
ordering the central intellectual and ideological construct of the
collective bargaining institution is the importance that this gives law.
pursuing their own economic and social goals". (Emphases added).
4 9 While layperson language may reflect a lack of sophistication, nonetheless it is interesting
to point out that, regardless of how much theorists, especially legal theorists, rebel against the
notion, everybody else speaks of a collective agreement as a "contract" in Canada.
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The ideology of absolute private property and of freedom of contract
between juridically equal people is primarily propagated and
effectuated through the legal system. In a context of legalistic
industrial relations this means that ideas fundamental to the
maintenance of capitalist relations of production are hidden from
view but, nonetheless, solidly embedded50
Questions such as what it is appropriate to bargain about
become legal questions, depending for their answers on criteria such
as what is "reasonable", "good faith", or "economic" (as opposed to
"political") bargaining. All these "criteria" or "principles", in turn, get
their meaning from unreferred-to criteria which are based on the
sacrosanct, almost absolutist, nature of property as presently
understood in law. For instance, labour jurisprudence has developed
which makes it an unfair labour practice for an employer to shrink
the bargaining unit size, that is, to get rid of unionized employees,
if his reason for doing so is anti-union animus. On the other hand,
it is perfectly acceptable to get rid of unionized employees if such
dimunition in bargaining unit size is attributable to the promotion of
the employer's economic (read private property) welfare. While
discretion is given to interpreters and administrators in these cases,
what is clear is that the need to protect the concepts of private
property/private contract remains the basis for such decision-making.
Similarly, disputes as to whether organization can take place
on an employer's private property or during the employer's
productive time are resolved by legal holdings that such union
activity can only take place if the employer has given permission for
this. That is, the employer's fundamental property rights are to be
preserved and, not incidentally, his right to keep on maximizing his
profits Again, the right of workers to protest, to picket, to
combine with other workers and people, are all shackled by legal
5 0 Ronald Wveitzer, "Law and Legal Ideology- Contributions to the Genesis and
Reproduction of Capitalism" (1980) 24 Berk. J. of Soc. 137; Alan Stone, "The Place of Law in
the Marxian Structure - Superstructure Archetype" (1985) 19 L. and Soc'y Rev., 39; Glasbeek,
supra, note 39 and "Why Corporate Deviance is not Treated as a Crime - The Need to Make
'Profits' a Dirty Word" (1985) 22 Osgoode Hall LJ. 393.
51Organization may take place on an employer's property where there is no alternative
available at all, for example, a logging camp or a ship. It is this kind of "breakthrough" which
permits legitimators of the system to argue that property rights are no longer absolute and that
our industrial relations systems do not particularly favour employers.
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rules which support and replicate property rights, such as trespass
rules, or the rules which determine whether or not there is a legal
integration of the property of various employers (the rules relating
to the ally doctrine), or the rules developed in respect of the right
of every individual to be left alone in her or his commercial life in
order to pursue her or his contractual and proprietary sovereignty
(the labour torts).
Because the law claims to protect all individuals equally by
upholding property and contractual rights, many of the fetters put on
collective workers' actions are perceived by the community as natural
and legitimate. Trade union activity which strays beyond these legal
boundaries is easily branded as unacceptable and worthy of
repression. Unsurprisingly, the first part of any description of an
ongoing labour dispute is a statement as to whether or not the
union is as yet in a legal strike position, or whether or not an
ongoing strike is itself legal or whether or not unfair labour practices
(that is, illegal practices) are engaged in by any of the parties.5 2 The
question of whether or not demands are just is always secondary in
any media discussion of industrial relations disputes. This, of course,
was the essence also of the private contract of employment regime
under which the overtly anti-working class judiciary developed the
rule that no outsiders - in particular no state institution such as a
court - should be permitted to determine whether or not the terms
of a contract of employment were immoral, oppressive or
unacceptable which, in point of fact, they nearly always were.53
5 2 Examples of this are legion. When this was first being written, The [Toronfo] Globe &
Mail, 10 October, 1985, reported that the newly elected leader of the Parti Quebecois, Pierre
Marc Johnson, had publicly stated that, while in the past the Parti Quebecois had allowed a
good deal of leeway to unions, under his reign, while he remained supportive of the rights of
trade unions to make legitimate demands, he would not tolerate the illegal kind of disobedience
of the law in which, at that time, ferry workers were engaging. While the rhetoric is not
significant for its content, it is significant for its tone: it is obvious that a politician who is
seeking popularity believes that it is important to stress the difference between a legal and
illegal strike. Similarly, Newfoundland's politicians who sought to build public support for their
stand against striking public servants emphasised the illegality of the strike. Since this article
was written, British Columbia politicians, faced by massive opposition to new restrictive labour
legislation, made as much as they could out of the fact that the opposition took the form of
illegal strikes. Woefully, such attitudes by politicians are notorious.
531 have made the supporting argument for this assertion elsewhere; see Glasbeek, supra,
note 39.
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A major effect of all this is that lawyers have come to play
a disproportionate role in the administration, application, and the
description of the scope and understanding of the major industrial
relations institutions. Legal theorists, in particular, have come to
carry the flag for the existing collective bargaining mechanisms. By
arguing that the new collective bargaining regimes are fundamentally
different from the previous individual contract of employment ones,
they have sought to emphasize that a new dawn has come. In
particular, they have stressed that, inasmuch as the outcomes of
collective bargaining and some of the practices may look very much
like contractual arrangements, they are different because they allow
workers to participate more and because they severely reduce the
"natural" prerogative of management which used to exist and,
perhaps most importantly, that even though the major activities of
trade unions seem to be concerned with the making of economic
gains, the institution of collective bargaining has given workers a new
dignity and justice which, when it is put together with the accretion
of rights in the civil sphere, has enhanced their status as real citizens
in our societies.54
I have sought to critique these arguments elsewhere.55 Here
it suffices to note the kind of smoke screen which is created.
Firstly, the emphasis is on the fact that collective bargaining creates
a semi-autonomous form of government, one which is not dependent
for its working and outcomes on the activities of non-participants.
Secondly, the argument says that it is not only true that real gains
can be made by relying on this modified kind of private ordering,
but also that the limitation put on collective workers' activity, in the
sense that it is not to be used in the public/political sphere, is not
a serious handicap. "Political" rights at the work place are evolving
satisfactorily and workers have political rights as citizens to alter
state policies which affect them. This latter kind of argument hides
the fact that overall state-capital-labour accords are likely to
continue to be made in much the same kind of political power
-4For one of the better expositions see H.W. Arthurs, "Developing Industrial Citizenship:
A Challenge for Canada's Second Century" (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 786.
5 5 Glasbeek, "Voluntarism, Liberalism and Grievance Arbitration: Holy Grail, Romance
and Real Life," supra, note 39.
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setting that they were when the much maligned individual contract
of employment regime was the centrepiece of formal labour relations
institutions. This is so because capital still has the same power that
it always had: as well as participating in the public/political sphere,
it can always threaten a capital strike.56 That is, capital remains as
unfettered as it always was and this becomes a real problem as
capital becomes ever more concentrated. Labour, however, must
find a way to express its collective wishes without being able to
utilize, directly, the new power it had won, namely its power to use
the strike as a legitimate weapon. This means that penetration of
the state by labour is likely to be very limited. In this context, in a
state which is no longer primarily interested in linking high wages to
high productivity to achieve economic growth - if it ever was -
labour is at a serious disadvantage.
The history of World War II developments suggests that
labour was to be given new and real power. The form that the
grant of that legitimation took57 made that power illusory because:
(a)It fragmented trade union power internally.
(b) It separated trade unions from one another and made
them potential competitors as an increase obtained by one group of
workers in an oligopolistic sphere might have to be paid for by other
workers.
(c) It separated trade unionists from other workers in the
same way. As it is the workers outside the collective bargaining
spheres who need most assistance from the state, whereas trade
unions have the least need for state intervention, there is no natural
incentive for those within the collective bargaining world to protect
those outside it by using their muscle to get the state to universalize
better floor rights; indeed the opposite may be true.58
56Fred Block, 'The Ruling Class does not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State"
(1977) 7 Socialist Revolution 6.
5 7In part, that form led to more fragmentation than might have been expected because of
the referred-to 1925 judicial decision to provincialize jurisdiction; see Toronto Electric
Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396, and text accompanying supra, note 41.
5 8 While this is not the place to detail it, there are allegations that trade unions in North
America have opposed basic employment rights, such as the AFL-CIO's opposition to a
minimum waie law or trade unions' resistance to better protection against unjust dismissal for
unorganized workers offered by the Canadian government.
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(d) The new collective bargaining scheme was posited on a
competitive model of capitalism in an economy in which capital was
immensely concentrated and continues to be so,s9 making the claim
that countervailing power had been created by the one employer/one
local bargaining schemes a very distorting one.
(e) The economic-political spheres were separated effectively
so that, should the state ever want to change the context in which
collective bargaining was to take place, or to interfere directly with
a particular bargaining situation, it was always in a position to do so.
(f) This potential was enhanced by the provincialization of
the industrial relations schemes, which made it even harder for
centralized, economic collectivism to be used effectively in a political
manner, especially vis-ii-vis a recalcitrant state (a provincial one)
egged on by local, rugged-individualist type enterprises. This meant
that regional, cultural, political differences and disparities were likely
to be accentuated.
(g) The legal-ideological climate in which collective
bargaining is to take place has always permitted an argument to be
made that the making of collective demands was a privilege which
ought not to be abused. Again, this facilitates state intervention
whenever abuse of the privilege, either by unions exceeding the legal
kinds of boundaries which exist or by their insistence on too
stringent an application of their legal rights, endanger the innocent
public's interest, as that public interest is defined by the state which
wishes to intervene.
(h) The role of the state as a supposed neutral which
promotes trade unionism for this kind of collective bargaining and
which is there also to protect the rights of individual employers and
individual employees, means that the state has been given the right
to determine such issues as what kind of organization will be
permitted and what amount of collective power individuals should be
given.
(i) Given that the legal-ideological climate in which these
institutional arrangements have been shaped is one which is really
only a revised version of the one which repressed trade unions so
5 9 See Report of the Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration (Ottawa: The
Commission, 1978) c. 18.
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efficiently throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, it
follows that the rules which belonged to that previous era were
never totally abrogated. They are there for certain state agencies
- in particular courts - to use whenever repression of working class
interests is called for. 60
(j) The technocratic, fragmented trade union movement
which has developed within these regimes is consequently wedded to
the restricted nature of an inward-looking focus, one aimed at
economic, localized self-advancement. The trade union movement's
legitimacy depends on accepting the fetters which restrict it in this
way, in particular, an acceptance of the role of the state as a
supposed neutral and agenda-setter. Trade unionists have been
made to feel more sanguine about accepting their shackled role
because they are surrounded by apparently well-meaning
propagandists who keep on asserting that "free" collective bargaining
devised in North America is the best of all possible systems because
it permits economic gains, semi-autonomous government, free from
intervention by the state and judiciary (the "real" enemy!), and gives
them a great deal of political advancement.
All of this means that, if the Canadian state wishes to
contain labour's demands, it is in an ideal position to do so. The
argument here is that it does just that whenever the logic of
export-led growth leads to a disinclination to use anti-cyclical
economic policies because these would be out of step with the
staple-led growth phenomenon. In that context, with the state
seeking to attract foreign capital as well as investment from local
capitalists, there will be a frequent need to dampen the aspirations
of the working classes in Canada. As the state is in a position to do
just that, it should be anticipated that it will do so.
60This is the importance of the recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions in the trilogy
of "right to strike" cases, brought down after this paper was written (Reference Re Public Service
Employee Relations Act (Alta.) (1987), 87 C.L.L.C. 14,021; Public Service Alliance of Canada v.
The Queen in Right of Canada (1987), 87 C.L.L.C. 14,022; Retail Wholesale and Department Store
Union, Locals 544, 496, 635 and 955 v. Government of Saskatchewan (1987), 87 C.L.L.C. 14,023)
and of Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986]
2 S.C.R1 573. While theorists ponder the intricacies of the arguments and their import for
Charter applications, the net result is the retention and perpetuation of anti-union doctrines
developed in the nineteenth century.
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VI. THE RHYTHMS AND CADENCE OF CANADIAN
LABOUR RELATIONS FROM AN "INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
AS A MECHANISM OF ADJUSTMENT" PERSPECTIVE
Near the end of World War II there was an outbreak of
major strikes by trade unions who had only just recently won Wagner
Act-type rights in 1944.61 The war time restraints were still in
place for two years after the war but, eventually, trade union
militancy led to a series of new structures and patterns being
set. By the 1950s there was a boom in export-led growth as
resources were in high demand. This was so because, as we have
noted, the European community had recovered somewhat and was
in a position to purchase goods. Canada also had obtained some
favourable tariff agreements and, in addition, the American economy
had identified Canada as one of its main sources of resources. It
was in this period that the pattern which exists today in respect of
collective bargaining and trade union development was founded. As
has already been pointed out, trade unionism grew to just slightly
over 30 percent of the work force and this figure remained fairly
constant until the early 1960s and, as we shall see, even when it
grew a little more, as it has over recent times, this did not denote
a staggering change in the density of unionization.
Even at this stage of development, when state policies seem
to be straightforward enough in their promotion of a particular kind
of collective bargaining, the state was already exercising all the
control it could in respect of the kind of unionization it wanted to
see promoted. The story has often been told and will not be
detailed here. By way of example, I just refer to the fact that the
communist and militant national trade union, The Canadian
Seamens' Union, was permitted to be ousted by the Seafarers
61 See HA. Logan, State Intervention andAssistance in Collective Bargaining: The Canadian
Experience 1943-1954 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956), who argues that, as the end
of the war neared, all labour activists were interested in whether the compromise struck during
the war was to persist after it and thus they were enticed to chance their arm. In addition, of
course, they were very well aware that their new rights had been granted not only because war
time production needed to be uninterrupted, but also because the CCF was showing signs of
gaining strength and something had to be done to counter its forward progress. See also
Stuart Jamieson, Industrial Relations in Canada, 2d ed.(Toronto: MacMillan, 1973).
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International Union, an American union, led by business unionists
intent on corruption rather than worker protection. Indeed, it is fair
to say that the Seafarers International Union was given leeway by
the immigration authorities which permitted its felonious leader to
come into the country. Various labour relations boards found that
communist-led unions were not real trade unions. The Seafarers
International Union's cause was further boosted by employers who
were eager to break legitimate collective agreements they had with
the Canadian Seamens' Union to enable them to enter into bargains
with the foreign interloper. Eventually, as is well known, after the
Canadian Seamens' Union had been safely ousted, the state declared
itself to be outraged by the Seafarers International Union's corrupt
practices and, after an inquiry, it was put into trusteeship.6 2 It is a
dramatic illustration of how the state, through its various agencies,
was perfectly willing to manipulate the rules in order to get the kind
of unionization that it wanted. A somewhat less celebrated story is
found in the co-operation the United Steelworkers of America got
for its ousting of the Mine Mill Union, which was a much more
militant and politically conscious union than Steel was. This
particular battle had a great effect on the history and potential of
the CCF.63
At this stage, nonetheless, the industrial relations system
could be said to be advancing workers' interests and to fit in with a
general acceptance of the idea that labour rights should be
recognized and that increases in wages were not only possible, but
tolerable, in large part because they helped to improve aggregate
consumer demand. That is, it was possible to say that the kind of
compromise which had been struck with labour was of a similar kind
to that which seemed to have been developed in the rest of the
industrialized world. But, while workers did make gains in the early
1950s, after difficulties in the late 1940s, the expansion of the
economy in the early 1950s which permitted this was, after all,
62See LW. Kaplan, veything that Floats: Pat Sullivan, HalBanks, and the Seanten's Unions
of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).
63 See J.B. Lang, '!A History of Organized Labour in Sudbury, Ontario", MA. Thesis, Guelph
University, Ontario, 1967.
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export-led.64 By the mid-1950s, perhaps even earlier, this post-war
boom in resource export was already slowing. Anti-cyclical economic
policies would have called for stimulation as the favourable export
conditions were fading, but given the nature of export-led growth, it
was also a period during which consumer demand and private and
public indebtedness was inordinately high. The government, worried
about the rising nature of inflation, determined to adopt monetary
restrictions rather than fuel the economy.65 Eventually this monetary
squeeze was supported by some fiscal restraint and, inevitably, led to
a slow-down, indeed a rather lengthy recession which lasted from
1957 until late 1962. In the result, workers' gains during the late
1950s were minimal.
When the monetary restraints were finally lifted and the
value of the dollar artificially was fixed below the American dollar
in value, as well as the contemporaneous promotion of some fiscal
expansion, 6  trade unions were able to take advantage of their
collective power in order to catch up on what they had lost during
those six or seven lean years. They became remarkably militant.
They were aided by the fact that major gains were made in the
economy through the advent of the Autopact, increased oil sales,
and two large grain deals with the USSR. There was a huge increase
in the number of strikes, many of which were unauthorized wildcat
strikes (often induced because workers found themselves locked into
two or three year agreements when they felt they needed, and could
achieve, an immediate change). 67 The increased incidence of strike
6 4 It may be pointed out here that gains were not obtained without struggle. There was an
increase of strike incidence over the decade of the 1950s, as reported by Stuart Jamieson,
Industrial Relations in Canada (Toronto: MacMillan, 1973). He also reported that there was
serious violence from time to time, as at Murdochville in 1957, and that there was some
vigorous repression of strike activity by the state, for instance, when rail workers were ordered
back to work in 1950. Gains were not handed over on a silver platter, but at least a platter was
available.
65Wolfe, supra, note 25, indicates that this policy may have been the result of the pressure
exerted by the then governor of the Bank of Canada, Mr. Coyne.
66AI1 this took place after the fall of the Diefenbaker government in 1962.
6 7 There were, of course, many other reasons for the strikes than just purely economic
ones. For instance, the work force was a much younger one, which had not experienced a
depression directly, and was much more optimistic (and therefore, insistent) about the good
life that it could and ought to have. Further, it was a better educated work force which did not
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activity was so great that, in Ontario, a commission on the use of
injunctions was established. The commission had been set up
because employers were using the state mechanisms to fetter trade
unions. In particular, as strikes increased, Ontario employers were
going to the courts, their old allies, to ask them to order workers to
stop doing irreparable damage to their business by inducing breaches
of contract. These orders were granted in increasing numbers68 by
Ontario lower level courts, often without hearing any evidence from
trade unions. The commission eventually recommended that these
practices should be stopped. In the end, an amendment to the
Judicature Act was passed which made the obtaining of ex parte
injunctions much more difficult, but not impossible. This point is
made to show that although the state can be responsive to working
class demands, that although here it was necessary (if it were to do
more than just give lip-service to its much publicized positive attitude
towards collective bargaining) to do something to curb the
employer-led revival of despised common law doctrines, the state is
always willing to keep embedded within the law those very precepts
which have helped contain the collective power of labour over the
centuries.
Similarly, the federal government faced with this upheaval in
Canadian industrial relations set up its own task force, the Woods
Task Force.69 This task force reported that there was a sad lack of
acceptance by individual employers of the collective bargaining
system but that, given a chance, the system could do a good job for
both the economy and society. What is of interest here is that there
was no pretence by that commission that this would lead to the
betterment of distribution of wealth or income from a worker's
accept managerial claims of expertise without question. In addition, the large civil rights
movements in the United States bred an anti-authoritarian attitude and, finally, and perhaps
most importantly, the change of government in Quebec, leading to the Quiet Revolution and
the development of non-church dominated trade unions, together with the right of the public
sector to organize, all gave unionists a sense of mission and power that must have engendered
a good deal of confidence in the efficacy of strike activity.
68There were 359 between 1958-1966, the numbers increasing from 25 in 1958, to 55 in
1962, to 77 in 1964, and back to 54 in 1965. These figures reflect the economic developments
set out in the text. See A.W.R. Carrothers & E.E. Palmer, Report of a Study on the Labour
Injunction in Ontario (Toronto: Ont. Dept. of Labour, 1966).
69Supra, note 48.
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perspective,70 but rather the emphasis was on the fact that, if
capitalism knew what was good for it, it would accept the scheme
because it created stability in production. The argument was that
disruption was sometimes regrettable but, given the scheme, it was
containable and in the long run a means by which to dampen
fundamental conflict because it acted as a catalyst and a catharsis.
71
Indeed, the commission was frank enough to argue that the real
objective of the collective bargaining system is to provide "a means
of legitimizing and making more acceptable the superior-subordinate
nexus inherent in the employer-employee relationship "72 by the
creation of a web of rules which would lead to a shared ideology.
What is interesting about this is that these theorists and
practitioners held fast to the belief that continuation of the scheme
would lead to a shared ideology and, eventually, to a stable enough
set of relationships, during a period when the tremendous outbreak
of union militance had raised serious doubts amongst politicians as
to whether this could ever be true. Yet, as has been stressed in this
paper, the liberal ideology which helped sell the scheme
(particularly to unions) had its impact on its perpetuation, even
when to the public it no longer seemed to serve its overt purposes.
A good illustration of this is found in the following passage, written
by a couple of men who then went on to detail the state of chaos
in employer-union relationships in the 1960s and how much
legislation and labour relations board activities had been necessitated
by these disruptions:
"I am not a Marxist," said Karl Marx when some radicals justified their idiocies on
Marxist thought. If he were alive today, he would repeat this remark. Many
premises of his theses have been proven wrong in that the injustices toward labour
that he justly complained about are now largely corrected. When he insisted in the
Manifesto of the Communist Party, "the history of all societies is the history of class
struggles," he had not foreseen the increasing identity - not only in interest but also
in person - of labour and capital in the modern industrial states of Western Europe
and North America. Capital today is gradually shifting from the hands of a limited
few to those of the many, the labourer is slowly becoming a capitalist himself, and
70See paragraphs 376-381 in which the commission frankly said
that all collective bargaining probably did was to change differentials between certain sectors
of workers, but not as between employers and the working classes.
71See ibid. paragraphs 392-403.
721bid. paragraph 291.
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those who control corporate business are assuming the status of employees.
Although some unfairness is still evident, wages and dividends today belie the
contention that capital exclusively appropriates the product of total social labour.
More significant, Marx had gravely underestimated the willingness of democratic
society to recognize the injustices and to remedy them, not by a political upheaval,
but by accommodation. Labour is no longer the serf of capital, neither is it the ward
of a welfare state..., labour relations problems no longer involve struggles for basic
principles; rather, they are bilateral experiments to realize accepted principles in a
relationship that, by its very nature, requires timely and constant adjustment. These
kinds of problems will always be with us for changing events dictate fresh assessment
of relations. What is necessary today is imaginative leadership in capital, labour and
government to avoid dispes that are bound to benefit no one but likely to hurt the
public and the economy.--
This notion that industrial conflict could be contained to
manageable size if there were only real adherence and allegiance to
the principles of the existing industrial relations policy was also put
forward by some of the most sophisticated observers during the same
period. Crispo and Arthurs,74 having analyzed the many reasons as
to why there might be conflict, argued that the trick was to make
unions more responsible and thus to have them help employers
manage workers. To this end, workers had to be given their head
sometimes:
As never before unions and their leaders are functioning as managers of discontent.
Their constraints are more rigid and inflexible, their mandate more tenuous, than is
generally appreciated. They need a reasonable freedom from external pressure if
they are not to become entirely the mere messengers of the discontented. Thus, if
union leaders are to do what is responsible in the long run, they may have to ? what
seems irresponsible in the short run, or the membership will depose them.
The story, so far, does not show, by itself, that industrial
relations was being used by the state as a means to chart its major
economic course. It does, however, show two things. Firstly, that
there were in existence, at all times, despite the radical changes
73 E.S. Binavince & R.D. Chapman, "Recent Developments in Canadian Law:. Labour Law"
(1967) 2 Ottawa LRev. 87.
74 j. Crispo & H. Arthurs, "Industrial Unrest in Canada: A Diagnosis of Recent
Experience" (1968) 23 Rels. Indus. 237.
751bid. These last ditch cries to streamline the existing industrial relations' system, rather
than to abandon it, so that a private ordering scheme, relatively autonomous from
macro-political economic considerations could be maintained, had its most tangible result in the
1973 British Columbia Labour Relations Code, RIS.B.C. 1979, c. 212. As we shall see, the spirit
of liberal pluralism which inspired this piece of reform was no more capable of withstanding
the logic of export-led growth policies than were the other industrial relations regimes in
Canada.
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which World War II seemed to bring, instruments of containment of
working class aspirations which were not all that dissimilar to those
which had been used prior to the advent of the modern collective
bargaining system. Secondly, that throughout the new period labour
has been forced to seek betterment primarily by private ordering
means rather than by reliance on the public sphere, that is, than by
reliance on its influence on the state. In respect of this point,
however, it is to be noted that the state nonetheless was, during
these relatively buoyant times, able to give life to the general plan,
devised during the latter part of the war, both to promote growth by
exports while enhancing consumer demands and to provide a
reasonable level of social welfare benefits. Remember that it is
during this period that most of the social welfare net was put in
place. But, the vagaries of an export-led growth economy were
catching up with the policy-makers and their true hand was soon to
be shown.
By the late 1960s, inflation was on the rise again. Restrictive
monetary policies were introduced, accompanied by restraint in fiscal
policies. Indeed, voluntary price-wage restraints were called for in
1969-1970. It is pertinent to note here that it was then that, for the
first time, Canadian wages had reached parity with United States
wages.76 It is at this point, therefore, that we can expect to see
some real state disaffection with the existing industrial relations
policy. To return: these policies of restraint led to heightened
interest rates, which led to an increase in capital inflows and
currency appreciation (assisted by the existence of a good market for
exports). All of this created good trade balances. Inherent in the
situation, however, was the threat that the high currency values
would undermine the potential for export of resources. The
government thus switched course and lifted its monetary restraints.
By then, however, the earlier restraints had created a good deal of
unemployment.
The government, worried about the political effect of
unemployment, liberalized the unemployment insurance entitlement
schemes at this stage and, by and large, introduced some stimulatory
76See H4. Logan, supra, note 61, for the relative wage rates for the early part of the
period and see also a report prepared by AA Porter et al. for The Wages Research Division
of The Economics and Research branch (Ottawa: Dept. of Labour, 1969).
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fiscal policies. This was done while the demand for, and price of,
Canadian resources remained high. In the economic expansion
which followed, inflation rose again. When the 1974-75 recession hit
Canada, its policy-makers were faced with some intractable problems
as a result of these sequential policy measures. In particular, near
the end of the early 1970s boom, trade unions had got themselves
into a position where they were aggressively trying to catch up, after
their pause in gains in the period 1969-1972. Once again, the
incidence of strikes increased. Consumer demand was very high,
leading to importation and all the difficulties that created for the
Canadian economy, specifically, inflation. Canadian policy-makers
needed to dampen this tendency, but had very few tools to do so
because, by now, it was clear that much of the inflation was induced
by branch plant behaviour, as previously discussed. 77 As this source
of inflation could not be tackled by domestic Canadian measures and
something had to be done about the fact that, with the onset of the
recession, trade balances were once again looking very bad,
policy-makers gave up all pretence of following anti-cyclical
Keynesian policies. Rather, they chose two other options. The first
was to use monetary policy to counter inflationary pressures and to
enable them to control the debt which was increasing as a result of
the large influx of imported capital. The other was to dismantle the
opportunities for the working classes to make gains. The way that
this latter policy was sold was to argue that Canada was to be made
attractive for capital investment by making it more competitive, in
effect, by squeezing labour. The latent ability of the state to
intervene if it became necessary was now to be made patent. While
the language of industrial relations remained the same, a revolution
took place.
The most obvious intervention was the introduction of the
federal Anti-Inflation Board legislation in 1975.78 The stated purpose
was to contain inflation. Of course, its real intent was to restrain
77A study done by R.S. Letourneau, Inflation, The Canadian Experience (Ottawa:
Conference Board of Canada, 1980), found that the major source of inflationary pressures
experienced in Canada during the 1970s was the practice of non-competitive importing by
branch plant operations. The author showed that more than 40 percent of inflation in Canada
during the 1970s had its origins outside Canada.
78The Anti Inflation Act, S.C. 1974-75-76, c.75.
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labour. The story is well known and only three points will be made
here. Firstly, despite overwhelming evidence that wage push was not
the major cause of inflation,79 and despite the fact that the state
claimed that, in its usual neutral way, it would constrain both prices
and wages, wages were far more severely restrained than prices.80
Secondly, it was clear that the legislation was antithetical to any
notion of private ordering. To overcome this, much was made of
the fact that the "emergency" made this an acceptable, temporary
supervision of the reign of a semi-autonomous scheme of industrial
relations. But, the government did not in fact prove that there was
anything like an emergency. The Supreme Court of Canada, another
state institution, when asked by unions to set aside the wage
restraint legislation because there was no constitutional basis for it,
found that it was valid legislation because it was a proper response
to an emergency. It held that this emergency could be assumed to
exist because the government had a rational belief that there was
one! Interestingly, as it happened, one of the chief architects and
proponents of Canada's version of collective bargaining was the
Chief Justice presiding over that court.
Laskin, C.J., upheld the attack on the system he idolized and
idealized while lamely claiming that collective bargaining had not
been totally abrogated because parties could still bargain about
non-wage issues. It is a very instructive, albeit anecdotal, illustration
of how shallow the commitment to pluralism really was in Canada.
The third point to make is to underscore the importance of the
fragmentation of labour power and of the effect of the split between
the economic and the politic which is so deeply embedded in the
industrial relations system in Canada. It is to be remembered that
part of the argument in this paper is that the trade union movement
79See the earlier point about the importation of inflation and also see the brief by the
leading economists in Canada put together by Richard Lipsey, offered in evidence in the
Supreme Court of Canada in the Anti-Inflation Reference, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, which is to be
discussed below. This brief, which was submitted as an appendix to the factum of the Canadian
Labour Congress, made a strong case to the effect that inflation was not a serious problem and
that in any event, it was not wage-led. The Supreme Court accepted the admissibility of this
evidence and then, by legal manoeuvres, discarded it from its considerations.
80See S. Jelly, "Effect of Wage Controls on Collective Bargaining" (1981) 3 Can. Tax'n:
J. Tax Pol'y 90 at 91, citing the Conference Board of Canada to show that wages were reduced
by 7.7 percent by the controls and that corporate profits before tax were 9.2 percent higher than
they would have been in the absence of the controls.
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has accepted this separation of the public and the private. Thus,
when the trade unions wanted to indicate their opposition to the
anti-inflation legislation they were forced to call for a Day of
Protest. What they, of course, wanted to do was to use their
economic power for political purposes: they wanted to call a general
strike. Both their mindset and their fear of reprisals against such
use of economic power led them to disguise the issue by calling it
something else and by not being very vigorous in their support of
it.81
Panitch and Swartzs2 have shown that there has been a steep
increase in back-to-work legislation over time. The rate of increase
has risen dramatically since the mid-1960s which, of course, fits in
with the theme of this paper. The imposition of back-to-work
legislation is always a clear indication that the state is willing to
intervene in the private ordering system when its sense of public
interest is endangered. There are two additional points to be made.
The first is that "the public interest", or "the rendering of essential
services" as it is sometimes referred to, has had an enlarged
definition as direct attacks on collective labour relations have
intensified; for instance, see the recent British Columbia and Alberta
legislation to this effect.s Note also the fact that the decision as to
whether or not to make an industry or service essential is often
made after the parties who believed that they had every right to
81 While this is an indication of the parlous state of politicization of the Canadian labour
movement it is important to note that it is not simply the result of lack of backbone by trade
unions. Quite a number of employers sought to inflict and impose damages and discipline on
workers who responded to the call for a strike against the AIB. It was relatively easy for them
to do so because of the claim that striking workers were in breach of collective agreements
when they used their economic power for political purposes. Only in British Columbia was this
avoided by a labour relations board holding that political demands did not constitute a trade
dispute and that, therefore, the labour relations board was not in a position to make cease and
desist orders; see generally P. Weiler, Reconcilable Differences; New Directions in Canadian
Labour Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1980) at 57-60. As we shall see, this was to rebound on the
British Columbia labour movement when it participated in Operation Solidarity. Meanwhile,
it underscores the fact that, at bottom, everybody is always conscious of the separation between
the economic and the political.
8 2 Supra, note 1.
83See, Essential Services DisputesAct, RS.B.C. 1979, c.113 (enacted S.B.C. 1977, c.83 and
S.B.C. 1978, c.42, s.11) which gives government the power to declare services essential; Public
Service Employees RelationsAct R.SA 1980, c.33, s.93. (enacted SA. 1977 cA0 s.93); and Police
Officer Collective Bargaining Act SA. 1983, c. 12.05, s.3(1); the latter two acts prohibit strikes.
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bargain to impasse, have bargained to impasse. There is, then, in
some sectors of the economy always a possibility that organization,
militance and costs incurred in pursuit of it, may be for nought.
This may very well have a chilling effect on the bargaining postures
taken by certain unions.
This point is related to the second one I want to make.
Gradually, back-to-work legislation has changed in character as the
state's attack on the industrial relations system (still described as a
private ordering one, a theology to which the state continues to
claim allegiance) mounts in intensity. In cases in which workers are
ordered back to work there is usually a provision that they shall go
back to work first and a settlement will be put in place later by a
neutral tribunal. Now, it will be noticed that the state's stated goal
of maintaining services in the public's interest will be served when
services begin again. There is little doubt that workers would go
back to work if they were given everything they had asked for,
leaving it to a neutral assessor to rule, at some time in the future,
that they might have to give back some of the gains they had just
obtained. But, it is never done that way. Workers are ordered back
on terms which, as a result of their legitimate claims as private
ordering/freely contracting parties, they had every right to refuse.
While individual employees can refuse, legally, to obey a
back-to-work order because they want to exercise their legal right to
refuse certain conditions of employment, employees cannot do so as
a combination, as a union. The only meaningful way of protesting
against back-to-work legislation is, therefore, denied to them. In
theoretical terms, then, being ordered back to work is not slavery
but, in practice, it is awfully close. The supposed commitment to a
new industrial citizenship does not look very good from this vantage
point. Recently, this has worsened. Arbitrators have been told that
when settling a dispute of this kind they ought to be bound by the
state's directives as to what is an appropriate settlement. And, even
more recently, the government had arrogated the power to set terms
in this kind of dispute by regulation.8
4
8 4 panitch and Swartz, supra, note 1 at 45-46, have a full discussion of such measures.
Recently, the Quebec government, when faced by large scale upheaval in its public sector, set
the conditions by decree for all of the public sector, including a lowering of wages, (An Act
Respecting Remuneration in The Public Sector, S.Q. 1982, c.35).
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The wilful overriding of collective labour rights which takes
place through back-to-work legislation and orders of this kind, is
legitimated by the state by claiming that it acts on behalf of the
whole of the electorate, whereas trade unions are merely sectoral
interest groups who must not abuse the privilege they have been
granted to pursue their narrow economic interests. The handicap
fragmentation of labour, its economism (imposed by the system) and
its lack of penetration of the state imposed when the state decides
to use the containment of labour as a major policy instrument, now
becomes even more manifest.
The most pervasive part of the onslaught on collective
bargaining since 1975, that is, since anti-cyclical policies have been
found to be unworkable in an economy which relies on export-led
growth and imported capital, has been the spread of income restraint
legislation. The ball was set rolling by the federal government with
its 6 and 5 legislation in respect of its own public sector.85 As
Panitch and Swartz have recorded,86 all the jurisdictions have passed
restraining legislation, in one form or another. Some of them are
more draconian than others. What is of interest here is the nature
and intent of these statutes.
First, one must examine their nature. Principally, these
statutes are directed at the public sector, that sector which the state
controls directly. The argument justifying this is that the state
should restrain its own expenditures. This, of course, means a
reduction in the number and quality of services it will render,
adversely affecting the social welfare net which it has created. This
is a further indication of how, when it is decided to abandon
Keynesian measures, this can be done directly by reducing spending
and indirectly by using industrial relations policy to attack the wages
In addition, the Quebec government recently has passed "an Act to ensure that essential
services are maintained in the health and social services sector" (S.Q. 1986, c.74, in force
November 11, 1986). This act kept transit drivers on the job through rush hour during the
1987 transit strike in Montreal; that is, striking was permitted, but only when it would not have
too much effect.
8 5Public Sector Compensation Restraint Act, S.C. 1980-81-82, c.122.
8 6Supra, note 1. Not only do they provide a good summarized account of the contents of
all these pieces of legislation, but they provide a most useful appendix, giving citations and
chronology.
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and security of government employees. Second, the state always
claims that it is entitled to do as it does because collective
bargaining is really a mechanism which protects sectoral economic
interests, and that, therefore, it ought not to be used to shackle the
political prerogatives of the state8 7 The separation of the private
from the public, of the economic from the political, which is so
deeply embedded in what was once thought to be a pro-labour set
of industrial relations institutions, now can be seen to serve its
purpose.
Turning to the intent of such legislation, the motivation in
large part is to set a pattern for private sector bargaining. The idea
is that this will create' an industrial relations climate in which
employers will be encouraged to face down employees, already
frightened by huge unemployment, the introduction of new
technologies, and the possibility of a deal on free trade which, to
them, means further integration into the U.S. economic system, an
integration which so far has proven to have cost them dearly. That
the demonstration effect to the private sector is one of the major
purposes of public sector restraints can be gauged from the candid
argument offered by the government's lawyers when the Public
Service Alliance of Canada challenged the constitutional validity of
the 6 and 5 legislation. The union argued that the legislation did
not constitute a reasonable limitation on its fundamental freedom to
associate. The government had to prove that it was such a
reasonable limitation and, in order to do so, it admitted that, while
there was no particular reason to believe that federal public servant
wages were the vanguard of the inflationary spiral which had to be
contained, the economic situation in the private sector was one
which required attention. Therefore, the argument made was that the
legislation was meant to be symbolic; it was meant to demonstrate
the need for restraint to the private sector.88
8 7 This was guilelessly revealed by the lawyers who appeared on behalf of the government
when it was prosecuting Jean-Claude Parrot in respect of what it had declared to be an unlawful
strike. See R. v. Parrot (1979), 27 O.Rt (2d) 333, 51 C.C.C. (2d) 539 (CA.). Leave to appeal
to S.C.C. refused 1980, 27 O.R. (2d) 333n, 106 D.L.R. (3d) 296n (S.C.C.)). Counsel for the
government told the court that the issue before it was a simple one: Who ran the country, the
government or Parrot?
88See factum of the Respondents (the federal government) in Public Service Alliance of
Canada et al v. R. et al (1987), 87 C.LL.C. 14,022 (S.C.C.).
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In this paper, in which the intent is to show that the
industrial relations system is used as a mechanism of adjustment by
the state, it is pertinent to know that the state was thus able to say
that it favoured collective bargaining, that it did want to continue to
treat it as a relatively autonomous institution but that nonetheless it
would like to see outcomes of a particular kind result from such
collective bargaining. That is, it could pursue its interest in
rolling-back labour demands as part of its macro-economic policies
while paying lip-service to liberal pluralism and to the pretence that
it wishes to treat labour as a real partner in economic-decision
making.
At this juncture, we can refer back to another one of the
points made about the inherent weakness of organized labour in
Canada. I refer here to the effects of the provincialization of the
industrial relations systems and the fact that each province with a
resource-based economy follows its own export-led growth policies.
Since the middle-1970s, these provinces have encountered difficulties
similar to those of the federal government and have attacked them
in much the same way. For instance, Alberta's oil-based economy
created very little manufacturing industry. Inasmuch as it created
employment, and thereby heightened consumer demand, most of the
work was found in construction. Major labour organizations and
gains were, therefore, made in that sector of the economy as well as,
of course, in the growing public sector as the state supported
investment strategies. As catalogued by Panitch and Swartz in their
account of recent legislation, the attack was mounted on those very
sectors.
In Alberta, the public sector has lost most of its collective
bargaining rights and construction companies have been encouraged
to set up spin-off corporations which may hire non-union labour.
These spin-off companies can bid for the same contracts as the
affiliated unionized corporation. The pressure this has put on the
construction trade unions has virtually destroyed them. The story is
much the same in Saskatchewan and in British Columbia. In 1984
in British Columbia, construction unions lost the right to enforce
non-affiliation clauses, that is, clauses which entitled union workers
to refuse to work alongside non-union ones. In addition, economic
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free zones have been advocated in which non-union contractors can
flourish, and the trend continues.8 9
Finally, note that when public servants were first permitted
to unionise, they were never given the "expansive" collective
bargaining rights that the private sector workers had been given.
Many public servants were not permitted to strike at all,9° many
were prevented from making demands in respect of which the state
had legislated,91 and many were excluded from bargaining because
they were deemed to be essential workers in essential sectors of the
economy. Two points emerge from this.
First, the trade union membership growth over recent times
is mostly attributable to public sector unionization. Although it is an
important development, it is significant to note that it does not
involve the same kind of trade union movement as that envisaged
after World War II, one which had the right to strike in certain
open periods. Second, while paying lip-service to the legitimacy of
collective labour power, the state was always careful to ensure that,
in the one situation where private, economic demands could not be
8 9 To give a flavour of the intensity of the legislative and agency attack, the following are
noted: Labour-Managment Dispute (Temporary Provisions) Ac S.S. 1981-82, c. L-0.1; An Act to
Amend the Trade Union Act, S.S. 1983, c.81; An Act to Repeal the Construction Industry Labour
Relations Act, S.S. 1983-84, c.2.; Dairy Workers (Maintenance of Operations) Act, S.S. 1983-84,
c. D-1.1.; Public Service Amendment Regulations 1984 under The Public Service Act, Sask. Reg.
16/84; Public Service Employees Relations Act, R1SA. 1980, c.33, s. 93 (enacted SA. 1977, c. 40,
s.93); Health Services Continuation Act, SA 1983, c.21; Labour Statutes AmendmentAct 1983,
SA. 1983, c. 34; Labour Relations Amendment Act 1983 Repeal Act, S.A. 1984, c.54; Bill 53,
The Construction Industry Collective BargainingAct (first reading 5 June 1987; second reading
10 June 1987. Third reading 15 June 1987; royal assent 17 June 1987; Effective 1 June 1987).
In March, 1987, the Alberta Labour Legislation Review Committee issued its final report
and the government announced its intention to introduce a new Labour Code and in May 1987,
a Public Review of apprenticeship and industry training was announced. Note also Essential
Services DisputesAct, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 113 (enacted S.B.C. 1977, c.83; 1978, c.42, s.11); Labour
CodeAmendmentAc 1982 S.B.C. 1982, c.59; Compensation StabilizationAmendmentAct, 1983,
S.B.C. 1983, c. 13; Public SectorRestraintAct, S.B.C. 1983, c.26; Employment Development Act,
S.B.C. 1983, c. 15; Employment StandardsAmendmentAc 1983 S.B.C. 1983, c. 16; Proclamation
of Section 4 of the Public Service Labour RelationsAmendmentAc, 1975, (S.B.C. 1975, e. 61) B.C.
Reg. 247/83; Labour Code Amendment Act 1984 S.B.C. 1984, c. 24.
Bills in Progress : British Columbia
Bill 19, Industrial Relations Act replacing B.C.'s Labour Code), (certified correct as amended
18 June 1987); Royal Assent 26 June 1987.
90In Ontario hospital workers, firemen, and police workers were also denied this right.
Alberta has adopted a similar approach of late; see generally, Panitch & Swartz, supra, note 1.
9 1 See the Public Service Staff Relations Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-35.
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differentiated very easily from public/political demands, the impact
of the collectivities would be blunted. Again, this tells us how
conscious the state has been, and is, of the need to use industrial
relations as a restraining mechanism.
Until the late 1960s, it is true to say (and therefore, as we
have seen, it was strenuously said by the theorists who propagated
the Canadian industrial relations system), one of the central
industrial relations state emanations, namely labour relations boards,
were favourably disposed towards collective bargaining rights.
Certainly, trade unions were given organizational protections by a
series of refinements in respect of unfair labour practices and their
enforcement. Boards also streamlined certification processes and
fashioned remedies against intransigent employers who were
unwilling to accept collective bargaining.92 Indeed, it could be said
that the labour relations boards, with their expertise, were committed
to establish themselves as neutral facilitators. Nonetheless, while all
of this was true, it was also true that these boards understood that
their major function was to stabilize capital -- labour relations and
to contain workers' power.
One of the central tasks of labour relations boards is the
selection of an appropriate bargaining unit; that is, they determine
the size and composition of such a bargaining unit. Manifestly, such
decisions affect the bargaining power of the parties. While, over
time, the processes have taken on a neutral look because they rely
on certain well-known criteria, an examination of some of the
underlying premisses is revealing. Such an examination shows that
it is the employers' productive needs which provide the basis for
most of the criteria used by labour relations boards in the
9 2 It is to be noted that major employers, such as, say, General Motors, had accepted the
logic and the utility of a stable trade union movement, particularly as it could be made
"responsible". Smaller employers, especially localized ones operating at the provincial level,
as Pentland has noted, were not so willing to accept the new state of play. They are the ones
who seem to fall foul most often of the labour relations board's rules. But it is not always so;
establishment institutions such as the banks, Eaton's, K-Mart, provide a counter case. See,
Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, AFL-C1O-CLC v. T. Eaton Co. Ltd (1985), 85
C.L.L.C. 16,027 (O.L.R.B.); Union of Bank Employees (Ontario), Local 210 v. Bank of Montreal
(1985), 10 C.L.R.B.R.(N.S.) 129 (C.L.R.B.); Union of Bank Employees, Local 2104 (CLC) v.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1985), 10 C.L.R.B.R. (N.S.) 182 (C.L.R.B.); Service
Employees International Union, Local 183 v. K-Mart Canada Ltd (Peterborough) (1981), [19811
O.L.RB. Rep. 50 (O.L.R.B.). In each of these cases the boards found these major corporations
guilty of unfair labour cases. Each of the cases is part of a well-established pattern of such
conduct by these corporations.
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designation of an appropriate bargaining unit -3 In addition, various
boards have made it clear what their objectives are when they are
determining an appropriate bargaining unit. They want to promote
a trade union which is viable enough to enter into serious collective
bargaining but one which is not so powerful that it will inflict real
economic harm94 Again, while they are eager to show respect for
the employees' wishes in theory, they will not permit the
fragmentation of an employer's enterprise to such an extent that
colluding trade unions could greatly inconvenience an employer's
productive efforts.95 In a similar vein, labour relations boards have
had to decide whether employees should be excluded from a
bargaining unit because they are managerial in nature. The
legislative history shows that, after some initial vacillation, a
deliberate decision was made to exclude managers.9 6 Further, while
lip-service is paid to the idea that workers should be represented by
trade unions whenever possible, the routinely applied by boards
permit anyone from a foreman on up to be classified as a manager
(although there are some exceptions to this).97 The exclusion of
managerial people from bargaining units helps to diminish the size
of the bargaining unit, to deny the bargaining agent better-educated
people and it helps to enforce both the hierarchical needs of the
employer and to bolster the will of jumped-up employees who
93 See R-O. McDowell, "Law and Practice before the Ontario Labour Relations Board"
(1978) 1 Advocates' Q. 198, who shows that the Board considers a number of factors: "the
nature of the work performed, the skill of employees, the functional coherence of
interdependence of work groups, the history of collective bargaining for this group and for
groups in similar circumstances, the organizational structure of the employer and the wishes of
the employees". Only the last criterion is based on factors within the control of workers.
94See Insurance Corp. of B.C. [hereinafter I.C.B.C.], [1974] 1 C.L.R.B. Rep. 403 at 407
(B.C.L.R.B.) 43 at 47: "A structure is needed which is conducive to voluntary settlements
without strikes and will minimize the disruptive effects of the latter when they do occur".
95See CUPE and the Board of Education for the City of Toronto (1970),[1970]
O.L.R.B. Rep. 430 at 435-36. Note also that it is fair to say that where there is a region-wide
bargaining scheme, as in the construction industry in Ontario, it has usually been created to
protect employers from being whip-sawed in precisely this manner.
9 6 The legislative history is summarized in United Steel Workers of America v. Conzinco Ltd
(1980), 80 C.L.L.C. 16,045.
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become keen to discharge the white man's burden imposed on them
in this way98
In more recent times, boards - with the help of the
legislatures and the courts - have used the same manipulative tools
and language which they had previously employed to promote "free"
collective bargaining and trade unionism, to help employers in their
quest to detooth trade unionism. A few items can be offered to
illustrate this:
Item (1) - The Nova Scotia legislature set the ball rolling
when it changed the rules in respect of the choosing of an
appropriate bargaining unit in the Michelin case. Workers who had
secured a majority in one plant were told that, from now on, they
would need a majority in both plants of the same employer. This
effectively prevented certification of the trade union and allowed
Michelin to continue to pay non-trade union benefits in its large
plants. The chilling effect of this state policy is obvious.9
A similar result was reached by the British Columbia labour relations
board in the I.C.B.C. case,100 making organization very difficult. 0 1
Item (2) - When asking for a variance in the designation of
a bargaining unit because an employer has expanded elsewhere, it
had been the common practice throughout Canada to certify an
9 8 See Kootenay Savings Credit Union v. International Woodworkers ofAmerican Local 1-405
(1976), [1978] 1 C.L.R.B. Rep. 36, in which it was decided that the board could exclude an
employee from a bargaining unit if she shared a "community of interests" with management.
That is, it was sufficient to show that neither the employee nor management was comfortable
with the employee's membership in a trade union. In part, this attitude towards management
may explain the fact that Canada has such a high proportion of its labour force engaged in
management or supervisory tasks. Nearly 7 per cent of the Canadian labour force is so
employed, as compared to 2.4 per cent in Sweden. Most observers put this down to the fact
that Canadian management is inefficient and that we are more interested in subjugating our
work force than in collaborating with it. But, it may also be due to the fact that we can, by
increasing managerial ranks, reduce the effectiveness of trade unionism.
99For a full description of the extraordinary nature of this decision and the effect it has
had on trade unionism, see B. Langille, "Michelin Bill in Context" (1981) 6 Dalhousie LJ. 523.
1 O0supra, note 94.
1 01 See Baigent, "Protecting the Right to Organize", in J.M. Weiler and PA. Gall, eds. The
Labour Code of Brtish Columbia in the 1980's (Calgary: Carswell, 1984) 45. He shows how this
requirement (that a union should organize the whole of an employer's organization), was used
to foil an attempt at trade union organization in a pulp mill and in a coal mining situation. It
was acknowledged by the board in those cases that, in determining an appropriate bargaining
unit in this way, it was helping employers to avoid the adverse effects of potential strike activity.
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existing bargaining agent for the additional workers if, in toto, it
would still have a majority of employees as its members. This
protected existing trade union rights. British Columbia's labour
relations board has made this protection a nullity by requiring that
a union in such a situation is to obtain a majority in the new unit
as well as in the pre-existing one. As, by definition, the two units
are really to become one, this means that whereas a simple majority
is initially sufficient, it is not so at a later point. The anti-union
nature of this is plain.10 2
Item (3) - When American President Ronald Reagan
dismissed the Patco workers, he created an outcry in the world,
including Canada. Some Canadian air traffic controllers took some
supportive action. After a long legal battle, the federal government
was able to put a stop to this nonsense by winning the unlimited
right to determine which air traffic controllers they could designate
as essential and, therefore, unable to use the strike weapon. Indeed,
the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the federal government
could decide unilaterally that all members of the unit could be
designated essential if it thought this to be a useful decision.1 0 3
Panitch and Swartz have demonstrated how designations of the kind
undertaken in the air traffic controllers case have, with the labour
relations boards and the legislatures' assistance, shown a marked
1 0 2 How deliberately anti-union this decision is can be gleaned from the fact that an existing
judicial precedent had to be distorted to make it, and by the fact that a subsequent Canadian
Labour Relations' Board decision took issue with the British Columbia board's approach; see
Baigent, ibid.
1 0 3 See Canadian Air Traffic ControlAssociation v.R. (1982),82 C.L.L.C. 14,191 [hereinafter
Air Traffic Control]. This is an example of how Canada often has achieved, in practice, the
same kind of draconian results extreme right wing regimes, such as those of Reagan and
Thatcher, fashion, without ever having to say that it has abandoned liberal democratic practices.
Other such examples include the withdrawing of welfare payments to people on strike, which
Canadian governments have always done but which raised a storm of outrage in the United
Kingdom when Thatcher did it in the recent coal miners strike. Similarly, the previous federal
government removed the "fair contracts" provision which required contractors to pay better than
minimum wage rates when bidding on federal contracts. The then minister, Mr. Lalonde,
explicitly adopted this stratagem to encourage wage restraints in the private sector, in particular
in the construction area, by allowing non-unionized contractors to bid on a competitive footing
with unionized ones. Fair contracts provisions have remained untouched, so far, in the U.K.
and in the U.SA.
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increase over recent times,1°4 in particular in the period during
which, as I have argued, Keynesian policies have been abrogated and
industrial relations policy has become a major weapon in the
maintenance of the export-led economy.
Item (4) - Burns Foods Limited was permitted to change its
bargaining unit from a national one to province-wide ones by the
Ontario Labour Relations Board when this suited Burns' collective
bargaining strategies, even though the national bargaining pattern
had been long-established and respected by both parties and all the
apposite statutory agencies in Canada.105
Item (5) - The Ontario Labour Relations Board has, fairly
recently, fashioned some forward-looking remedies to keep
recalcitrant employers in line. Employers who purported to bargain
when they knew that any ensuing collective agreement would not
bite very hard because they would be moving their operations away
from the site in respect of which the bargaining was taking place
have been found to have been bargaining in bad faith because they
did not share their knowledge with the union.1 6 But, the board
never told those employers that they had to stay where they were,
which would have granted a real remedy to the bargaining unit
members who were likely to lose their jobs because they could not
take advantage of the remedies actually offered. That is, the board
was very careful, in the end, to respect the economic (read property)
rights of employers. Thus, the decisions, although much heralded,
did, in the final analysis no more than educate employers in how to
do in the future the things they had been doing, but without falling
foul of the law. Note that even in the very cases in which these
apparently attractive remedies were being fashioned, they were not
all that helpful. The Radio Shack case illustrates this point. The
104Supra, note 1 at 42 where they show an increase in the Treasury Board's proposals to
use "designations" to remove the right to strike from public sector workers. Prior to the 1982
Supreme Court of Canada ruling in the Air Traffic Control case, Ibid., the Treasury Board
proposed to designate, on average, 46 per cent of each bargaining unit; in 1984, proposed
designations averaged 75.9 per cent.
1 0 5Burns Meat Ltd (1984), [1984] O.LR.B. Rep. 1049.
1 0 6 See Westinghouse Canada Limited (1980), [1980] O.L.R.B. Rep. 577, Sunnycrest Nursing
Homes Limited (1982), [1982] 2 C. LR.B. Rep. 51, Consolidated Bathurst Packaging Ltd (1983),
[1983] O.LR.B. Rep. 1411.
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initial remedy, much praised in labour relations circles because of the
protection it offered unions and their members, was imposed on an
employer who had already managed to reduce its work force by half
by the time the dust had settled, thereby rendering the union much
less powerful than it had been. Moreover, the labour relations
board seems to have retreated. Thus, when the same unit of Radio
Shack workers were bargaining for their second collective agreement
and failed to win what they sought after a long and bitter strike,
they voted to accept an earlier offer made by the employer which
they had steadfastly refused to accept for nearly six months. The
employer then took that offer off the table and when the employees
complained that this was bargaining in bad faith, the board denied
their claim.107 Similarly, that same labour relations board has
recently strengthened the employer's hand in the fight to obtain
concessions from workers by its decision to permit an employer who
had locked out its employees to continue its production with
scabs.10s  More recently, its interpretation of what good faith
bargaining meant sanctioned behaviour by Eaton's which, in the
halcyon days of the 1960s, would almost certainly have been held
to be unacceptable. This helped defeat the strikers who were trying
to organize this notorious anti-union employer. °9
Item (6) - The Ontario labour relations board has recently
underscored the fact that legitimate trade unions are not to engage
in politics in the public sphere by denying the right of political
activists to canvass workers while they are at work. Freedom of
speech, freedom of association, and freedom of conviction and belief
are to play second fiddle to employer's property rights and profit
maximization opportunities. The wedge between workers as
107United Steelworkers of America v. Radio Shack (1979), 80 C.L.L.C. 16,003 (O.L.R1B.) was
the remedy-furnishing decision. In the subsequent case the employer's position was favoured:
United Steelworkers ofAmerica v. Radio Shack (1985), 86 C.L.L.C. 16,006. For a similar decision,
see Shaw-Alnec Industries Limited (1984), [1984] O.L.RIB. Rep. 1502
lOSwestroc Industries Ltd. (1981), [1981] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 315 (O.L.IRB.).
1 09 T. Eaton Company Ltd (1985), [1985] O.L.R.B. Rep. 491
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economic beings and workers in their role as national citizens has
thus been made a little bit more effective.110
Item (7) - The right to secondary picketing is vital to workers
who want to affect the business of their immediate employer. This
right has always been seriously circumscribed.11 1 As was noted, the
1973 British Columbia legislation was enacted on the understanding
that unions had to be given more collective bargaining powers than
had been the case in the 1960s. They were, therefore, given the
right to exercise their secondary boycott rights more efficiently than
unions had been in other jurisdictions. This right had been rolled
back sharply so that, by 1981, it resembled more that prevailing in
other provinces.112
Item (8) - In British Columbia, the board was a central actor
when Operation Solidarity threatened to meld the economic and the
political. The board was asked to issue many cease and desist
orders, as union after union sequentially went on strike. All those
unions which claimed to be acting politically were permitted to
continue to strike. This was so because, as was seen in the Day of
Protest case 113, it had been decided that the labour relations board
of British Columbia had no jurisdiction where a strike was overtly
political. But, where the strikers were striking in support of another
union, as most of them were in the British Columbia upheaval, it
was possible to hold them responsible and, therefore, to issue cease
1 1 0 See The Adams Mine, Cliffs of Canada Ltd Manager (1982), 83 C.L.L.C. 16,011
(O.L.R.B.). This is, of course, also the most tangible result of Re Lavigne and Ontario Public
Service Employees Union (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 449 (Ont. H. Ct.). Whatever the outcome, the
significance of the case is its explicit message that trade unions are only meant to engage in
collective bargaining (read private economic ordering), not politics.
111See D. Beatty, "Secondary Boycotts: A Functional Analysis" (1974) 52 Can, Bar Rev.
388; J. Manwaring, "Legitimacy in Labour Relations: The Courts, The B.C. Labour Board and
Secondary Picketing" (1982) 20 Osgoode Hall L 1. 274. These writers disagree about the ambit
of permissible secondary boycott activity, but not about the fact that there were serious
constraints. This was endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in its decision in Dolphin
Delivery, supra, note 60.
112See the Labour Code AmendmentAc4 1984, S.B.C. 1984, c.24 which also increased the
facility for decertifying trade unions and support to non-union construction contractors;
remember also the B.C. labour relations board attacks on union strength, discussed in text at
note 89. Since then, the British Columbia government has passed Bill 19, supra, note 89, which
seems to erode all pre-existing rights.
113Supra, note 81.
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and desist orders. The irony of this was that the apparently
generous reading renders political action by trade unions legal for
the purposes of the governing labour legislation, but made
participation in political activity very difficult precisely because it had
to be devoid of any economic purposes.
VII. SUMMATION
It has been seen that the commitment to Keynesian
economics was never full blown in Canada. In particular, there was
no post-war reconstruction of the economy which envisaged that
labour would become something like a real partner in the
capital-state-labour accords. Rather, there was a granting of a
measure of collective bargaining power, which was propagated as
being both fair, in that it gave labour real bargaining power - albeit
economic and good, because it advanced a pluralist liberalist society.
At the same time, the state showed some inclination to provide a
real social welfare net. But, when the boom and bust nature of the
economy, closer integration into the American economy (which is
the largest purchaser of Canadian exports as well as the largest
provider of capital into Canada) and a continued weakness of
investment in Canada, all made it clear that anti-cyclical policy would
not cure the inflation-unemployment manifestations which recurred
in the economy, nor the unsettling fluctuations in trade balances
which kept on surfacing, the Canadian state began to turn to the
more natural policy of supporting capital by shifting the burden of
the boom and bust economy to the working classes. It did so by
using the structure of the very industrial relations policy which had
promised so much to the workers at the end of the World War. It
exploited the inherent weakness which existed as a result of the
fragmentation of the industrial relations power given to trade unions
and by reliance on the cleavage between the economic and the
political which enabled the state, while using the language of liberal
pluralism and declaring its acceptance of the legitimacy of trade
unionism, to act as a direct controller of large segments of the work
forces and, by attacking its own workers, demonstrating to the
private sector how it ought to behave vis-a-vis labour. In this
climate, employers have made the most of rampant unemployment
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and generally bad conditions for workers: concession bargaining has
become the norm.
Some of the tactics used by employers are relatively primitive,
as some of the illustrations set out in the paper show. It is very
difficult to speak, as politicians are wont, of any kind of
labour-capital compromise which permits labour to hold up its head.
There can be no compromise. The oft-heard exhortations to the
effect that some co-operative spirit ought to exist between labour
and capital are profoundly ironic: they suggest to labour that it
should accept a new order, fit-in, become "more flexible" in its
demands vis-t-vis capital; yet these are calls which, if heeded, doom
labour to defeat. The agenda for a new compromise is one which
will make the Canadian working classes victims in the new political
economy which will be one of continuing export-led growth and
further integration into the U.S. political economic system.
The second limb of the state's role in creating this new world
goes hand-in-hand with the attack mounted on workers for the
benefit of capital: it is to help capital directly and to entice
capitalists to invest in Canada. This is done by implicit guarantees
of bailouts should there be large failures, 114 by ensuring low wage
cost,115 and by indirect inducements to capital by a series of tax
expenditures, in particular during the period identified as the
beginning of the abandonment of the post war compromise.116
1 1 4 These are now so legion and so many that they hardly need to be detailed. See M.
Trebilcock et al., The PoliticalEconomy ofBusiness Bailouts, vol. 2 (Toronto: Ontario Economic
Council, 1985). It must be quite comforting for large investors to know that the Canadian state
will not let them bear the brunt of any risk that materialises.
115A recent information bulletin put out by the Ministry of Industry and Trade in Ontario
starts off by stating that Ontario is an attractive place to invest in because it has "lower labour
costs; in 1983 our average hourly pay for workers in industrial production was $10.53/hr; 36
cents an hour less than the U.S. average; from 36 cents to $3.79 less than the rate in the Great
Lakes States adjoining Ontario .... Fringe Benefit costs are 50% less than the European norm
and lower than in the United States ..... The minimum hourly wage in Ontario is $4.00 ..... This
text is accompanied by dramatic graphics highlighting for foreign investors how "competitive"
the Ontario work force has become of recent times. (The pamphlet is available on request).
116See K.N. Matziorinis, 'The Effectiveness of Tax - The Incentives for Capital
Investment" (1980) 2 Can. Tax'n: J. Tax Policy, 172. Tax expenditures include accelerated
depreciation, corporate tax reductions, and exemptions from tax as well as investment tax
credits. The writer shows that the amount of handouts, byway of lost revenue to the state and
gains for capitalists, between 1965 and 1975, was 11.2 billion in constant 1975 dollars. From the
perspective taken in this paper it is interesting to note that, while there was a lag in direct shifts
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Things look very bleak.
of capital during the period 1968-1971, there was a measurable increase in the period 1973-1977,
precisely at the time when the attacks on workers began in earnest. The double-barrelled
approach used by the state to help Canada's weak capital sector, at the expense of workers,
becomes very plain.

